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The network of fake Pravda sites: a tool for manipulating public opinion

In response to increasingly aggressive disinformation campaigns, the European Union has adopted strict sanctions against Russian media outlets that manipulate information and spread propaganda. Among such tools for manipulating public opinion, the network of fake Pravda websites stands out in particular, using only seemingly credible websites to disseminate misleading content.

These websites are problematic not only because they contain inaccurate information, but also because of their ability to polarise societies, create distrust in democratic institutions and undermine unity among EU Member States.

The French agency for countering digital interference Viginum revealed the operation of this sophisticated propaganda mechanism in its Portal Kombat report. The network of fake Pravda sites was established in June 2023 and primarily targets countries that support Ukraine. The network's activity focuses on spreading misleading narratives through websites that merely imitate independent media outlets. Due to the awkward language and numerous grammatical errors, it can reasonably be assumed that the content is generated through automated machine translation and consists largely of press releases issued by Russian state institutions, reports from pro-government news agencies and posts from pro-Russian social media profiles, particularly on the Telegram platform.

Structure and operation of the fake Pravda websites

Viginum's analysis has shown that all fake Pravda sites share common technical characteristics. The websites use the same IP address, most often hosted on a server located in Russia, and have a uniform portal design. These sites do not focus on original content but instead recycle material from three main sources:

  1. Accounts of Russian or pro-Russian actors on social media;
  2. Russian news agencies;
  3. Local official websites or media outlets whose content is translated using AI-powered translation tools.

The fake Pravda sites are also optimised for search engines, allowing them to quickly reach a large audience. In this way, misleading narratives appear as legitimate articles, gaining the trust of the wider public. The fake Pravda sites do not list an editorial office or imprint and are not registered in the official media register.

Adaptation of strategies and a new series of websites

After the network of fake Pravda sites was exposed in 2023, Russia adapted its tactics. According to the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), a new series of fake Pravda websites focusing on European languages was registered in Russia at the end of May 2024. These websites use a slightly different URL structure: instead of pravda-[xx].com, they now use [xx].news-pravda.com. Despite the change in URL addresses, the basic operating principles, the appearance of the websites and the methods of obtaining content remain unchanged.

Example of impact in Slovenia

Slovenia is among the countries targeted by these fake websites. A dedicated fake Pravda portal was created for Slovenian audiences, focusing on topics that provoke polarisation and uncertainty, such as the energy crisis, support for Ukraine and the role of the EU in international politics.

The fake Pravda portal aimed at Slovenian audiences resembles a news website, but a closer analysis shows that it does not meet the legal requirements to qualify as a media outlet. Under the Mass Media Act, a publisher/broadcaster must register the mass medium at the competent ministry prior to commencing the performance of activities so that the mass medium can be entered in the Mass Media Register. In doing so, the applicant must provide the following information:

  • The name of the mass medium entity;
  • The name or company name and registered office address or address of permanent residence of the publisher/broadcaster;
  • The publisher's/broadcaster's responsible person if the publisher/broadcaster is a legal person;
  • The type of the mass medium and its publishing/broadcasting interval;
  • The full name of the editor-in-chief;
  • The registered office of the editorial board or editor-in-chief;
  • The mode and envisaged coverage area in disseminating programmes;
  • The language in which the content is disseminated;
  • Sources and methods of financing;
  • Data on persons with a minimum of a 5% ownership or management share or share of voting rights in the assets of a publisher/broadcaster of printed general news journal or weekly magazine and a radio or television channel.

The Mass Media Register is public and accessible to anyone wishing to verify which media outlets are registered in Slovenia. The fake Pravda portal aimed at Slovenian audiences does not appear in the register and therefore cannot be considered a media outlet. The Pravda website also does not disclose the identity of the responsible person of the publisher, the name of the editor-in-chief or the publisher, nor the registered address from which the creators of the website's content operate. All published texts are unsigned and often refer to posts from social media profiles, particularly from the Russian messaging application Telegram. The texts also contain grammatical errors, which suggests that they are produced through automated machine translation and the publication of Russian messages.

Viginum's findings and the significance of the disclosure

The Portal Kombat report by the French agency Viginum clearly highlights how the network of fake Pravda sites operates as part of a broader propaganda apparatus. The aim of these websites is not merely to spread disinformation, but also to influence public opinion in ways that undermine democratic values and European unity.

The exposure of these methods underscores the importance of cooperation among EU Member States in countering digital interference. Transparency, public awareness and education on recognising false information are key steps in preventing the further influence of such networks.

These findings are also confirmed by the third report of the European External Action Service (EEAS) on threats related to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). The report describes the digital infrastructure established by foreign actors, including Russia and China, to manipulate and interfere in the information space of the European Union and its partner countries.