# GENDER EQUALITY IN DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS - SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSPARENT STAFFING 

# Gender Equality in Decision-Making Positions Significance of Transparent Staffing <br> Final report 

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## Published by:

The Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Kotnikova 28, Ljubljana

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Sonja Robnik, Equal Opportunities Department
Design and print:
Tiskarna Oman

## Number of copies:

1.200

The publication is available on the following website: http://www.mddsz.gov.si
This publication is a part of the Include.All project, co-financed by the European Union from the funds of the PROGRESS programme. The European Commission is not responsible for the content and its further application, since it represents the views of the project implementing party. The Include.All project is co-implemented by the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, the Managers' Association of Slovenia and the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption.

CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji
Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana
005.5:316.346.2(0.034.2)

ROBNIK, Sonja
Gender equality in decision-making positions - significance of transparent staffing [Elektronski vir]
: final report / Sonja Robnik. - El. knjiga. - Ljubljana : The Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2015

ISBN 978-961-6471-28-2 (pdf)
280874752

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## 1. Introduction

Within the Include.All project, co-implemented by the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, the Managers' Association of Slovenia and the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption in the 2013-2015 period, the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities and the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption carried out research on (non)transparency, (non)corruptness and gender (non)discrimination of the staffing practices for management positions at the end of the year 2014.

The purpose of the research is to contribute to the understanding of the situation in decisionmaking positions in the Slovenian private and public sectors from the diversity perspective - in particular, the balanced representation of women and men, and to the understanding of the impact of transparent and non-corruptive personnel selection procedures on gender equality in the studied organisations and also to the insight into the situation in the field of organisational measures for the career development of women. In particular, the research wished to contribute to the understanding of management selection procedures from the perspective of possible obstacles to the balanced representation of women in decision-making positions.

Therefore, the following has been analysed from the gender equality perspective:

- the situation in the field of the representation of women and men in the highest decisionmaking positions in an organisation,
- opinions on the culture and climate in the working environments with an emphasis on the perception of sexist and non-transparent or corrupt operating working environments,
- transparency of staffing procedures,
- opinions on the general acceptability of discriminatory and non-transparent staffing,
- more detailed analysis of management selection procedures with an emphasis on middle management,
- situation in the field of diversity with an emphasis on gender from the perspective of organisational measures and activities to improve the situation.




## 2. Research plan and work methods

The main purpose of the research was to analyse the situation in the field of staffing practices from the perspective of the procedures' transparency and gender. Due to a poor response to the invitation to participate in the research "Gender equality in decision-making positions in business" (Enakost spolov na mestih odločanja v gospodarstvu) which was carried out by the Faculty of Social Sciences within the Include.All project a few months before our research was conducted, and with the aim of obtaining a big enough sample of medium-sized and large organisations (namely, with more than 50 employees) that have the management hierarchy system introduced, we have included both the organisations of the private and public sectors in the research. We were also interested in the difference in the staffing practices in these two sectors. Since we are not familiar with either the Slovenian or the foreign research that would have already addressed the field of recruitment to management positions both from the gender and transparency perspective, we have developed our own research tool'. The survey questionnaire was composed of seven thematic sections (Demographic data on the organisation, Management, Working environment, Staffing procedures, Last employment of management, Adopted and planned measures, and Obstacles for achieving balanced gender representation).

The data collection was carried out from 10 to 24 October 2014, but due to technical difficulties with hosting on the server we stopped the surveying procedure on 15 October and informed the participants of the non-working link. The surveying procedure was re-established on 17 October 2014 (using the open source tool LimeSurvey ${ }^{\text {® }}$ ), and the deadline for filling in the survey was set at 7 November 2014. On 3 November, we notified all of the organisations by means of a reminder that the deadline had been extended to 14 November 2014. In motivating the organisations to participate, we were also assisted by the Slovenian HR Association that sent the link to the online questionnaire to human resource managers. In total, we obtained 543 completely filled in survey questionnaires.


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## 3. Conceptual starting points

Gender equality is a fundamental principle of democratic societies, in which women and men shall equally participate in all fields of public and private life "and they shall have equal status, equal opportunities for the exercising of all rights and for the development of their personal potentials by which they contribute to social development, as well as equal benefit from the results arising from that development" (Article 4 of the Equal Opportunities for Women and Men Act). The balanced gender representation means that the participation of each gender is minimum $40 \%{ }^{2}$. Namely, such representation means the possibility to influence decisions and contribute to changes. The balanced representation and participation of women and men in decision-making processes is a principle of democracy and a factor without which actual gender equality cannot be achieved. Non-utilised educational and work potential of women is an important source of economic and social growth and development, thus the full representation and participation of women in decision-making in all economic sectors is of key importance.

The arguments for the balanced representation ofwomen and men in decision-making positions are of several types - roughly, they can be divided into the social justice and business case arguments (Teigen 2012, Huse et al 2010). The social justice argument is based on the fact that women and men each constitute approximately one half of the population and approximately equally participate in the labour market and that women are, on average, better educated compared to men, while, despite all the stated facts, they do not represent a proportional share of decision-making positions in the economy. On the other hand, the business case argument is based on research that has proven the positive connection between the presence of women on company boards and the business results of these companies.

One of the possible reasons for the underrepresentation of women or the overrepresentation of men in the highest decision-making positions in the economy are the non-transparent staffing and appointment procedures. The decisions and practices are defined as transparent when the information on the implementation method is also available to those outside the organisation and is precise and understandable (Brink et al. 2010) - we could also say fair. The building of a career is not important only for an individual woman or man, but also for organisations Antonio L. Garcia-Izquierdo et al. (2012) estimate fairness in organisations as an exceptionally important factor in promoting the efficient operation of the organisation. In connection with promotion, fairness in organisations is composed of the following three elements: the perception of fairness is influenced by the variety of criteria used by the organisation for decision-making on promotion; people perceive promotion that is based on their work as more fair than other types of promotion; and, the characteristics of the promotion are important for the perception of fairness (Allen 1997, Beehr and Juntunen 1990, Kaplan and Ferris 2011 in ibid.). Namely, transparent staffing with clear and pre-determined criteria can positively influence the employed persons' perception of the organisation as fair and thereby, increase their work motivation. Thus, fair and non-biased promotion systems also influence the employed persons to participate in such organisational practices that are good or at least harmless for the organisation (ibid.).

In continuation, the situation in the worldwide and European area in the field of the balanced representation of women and men at different levels of management of organisations and an overview of the foreign and Slovenian practices to improve the situation are presented,

[^1]whereby it is reasoned why the balanced representation of both women and men in economic decision-making positions is a necessity and not a caprice. In the last part, the results of the Slovenian research on the management appointment and selection procedures used in the Slovenian private and public sectors are presented. The research report is concluded with a commentary on the results and the proposals for action.

### 3.1 What is the situation like?

The International Labour Organisation prepared an overview of the situation in 108 countries, whereby all management position levels were included. Jamaica has the highest - almost a 60 percent share of lower, middle and higher managers are female (59.3 \% in 2008), followed by Colombia (53.1 \% in 2010) and Saint Lucia (52.3 \% in 2004). Among EU member states, Latvia, where the share of female managers amounted to $45.7 \%$ in 2012, performed best with seventh place. It is followed by France in 24th place (39.4 \% in 2012) and Slovenia in 26th (39.0 $\%$ in 2012). Among one hundred and eight countries, the situation is the worst in Jordan (5.1 \% in 2004), Algeria (4.9 \% in 2004) and Pakistan (3.0 \% in 2008).

Table: Women at all management levels in total (lower, middle, higher) in 108 countries

| Place | Country | Year | Share of all female managers <br> (last available data up to year 2012) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | Jamaica | 2008 | $59.3 \%$ |
| 2. | Colombia | 2010 | $53.1 \%$ |
| 3. | Saint Lucia | 2004 | $52.3 \%$ |
| 4. | The Philippines | 2012 | $47.6 \%$ |
| 5. | Panama | 2012 | $47.6 \%$ |
| 6. | Belarus | 2009 | $46.2 \%$ |
| 7. | Latvia | 2012 | $45.7 \%$ |
| 8. | Guatemala | 2012 | $44.8 \%$ |
| 9. | The Bahamas | 2009 | $44.4 \%$ |
| 10. | Moldova | 2012 | $44.1 \%$ |
| 15. | United States of | 2008 | $42.7 \%$ |
| America | Iceland | 2012 | $39.9 \%$ |
| 24. | France | 2012 | $39.4 \%$ |
| 26. | Slovenia | 2012 | $39.0 \%$ |
| 106. | Jordan | 2004 | $5.1 \%$ |
| 107. | Algeria | 2004 | $4.9 \%$ |
| 108. | Pakistan | 2008 | $3.0 \%$ |

[^2]The European Commission collects data for the largest publicly quoted companies - in the EU-28, there are 614 such companies, and in Slovenia 20. Both at the EU-28 level and at the level of individual countries we cannot say that the shares of women and men are balanced, whether we are referring to the board chairperson or member positions or general, executive or non-executive director positions. Regarding the balanced representation of women and men in these positions, Slovenia ranges around the EU-28 average - it performs more poorly in terms of the share of female board chairpersons, its share of female board members is at the average level, and in terms of general, executive and non-executive director positions, it is placed a few percentage points above the EU-28 average. There is not a single country in the EU with balanced gender representation in any of these positions - France is the closest to balanced representation ( $32 \%$ of female board members and $33 \%$ of female non-executive directors). On the other hand, there are a number of countries where, in the largest publicly quoted companies, there is not a single female board chairperson or general director.

Table: Women in decision-making positions in the EU-28, the largest publicly quoted companies, situation in October 2014

|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { EU-28 } \\ \text { (614 } \\ \text { companies) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Slovenia } \\ \text { (20 } \\ \text { companies) } \end{gathered}$ | Countries with the highest shares | Countries with the lowest shares |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Share of female board chairpersons | 7 \% | 5 \% | Poland (26 \%) <br> Romania (20 \%) <br> Slovakia (20 \%) | Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal (all 0 \%) |
| Share of female board members | 20 \% | 20 \% | France (32 \%) <br> Latvia (32 \%) <br> Finland (29 \%) | Malta (3 \%) <br> Czech Republic (4 \%) <br> Estonia (7 \%) |
| Share of female general directors | 3 \% | 5 \% | Romania (22 \%) <br> Malta (10 \%) <br> Slovakia (10 \%) | Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Finland (all $0 \%$ ) |
| Share of female executive directors | 13 \% | 21 \% | Romania (23 \%) <br> Sweden (23 \%) <br> Slovenia (21 \%) | Czech Republic (4 \%) <br> Austria (4 \%) <br> Poland (4 \%) |


|  | EU-28 <br> (614 <br> companies) | Slovenia <br> (20 <br> companies) | Countries with <br> the highest <br> shares | Countries with the <br> lowest shares |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Share of <br> female non- <br> executive <br> directors | $21 \%$ | $22 \%$ | France (33\%) | Czech Republic (2 \%) |
|  |  |  | Latvia (32 \%) | Malta (3 \%) |

Source: European Commission, database on women and men in decision-making positions

### 3.2 What are effective practices?

Many European countries followed Norway which enacted the minimum share of both genders in management boards of publicly listed companies and of state-owned or municipally-owned companies in 2003. The biggest developments in the law have been made in the last few years, when the highest number of countries adopted the legislation.

The countries began addressing the question of gender-balanced representation in the field of political participation, since the low participation of women in political decision-making processes posed a big problem in numerous countries. The countries adopted a variety of measures - from so called softer (e.g. raising social awareness of the importance of more active participation of women; raising awareness of political parties that equal participation of women and men in political decision-making processes is one of the foundations of democracy; granting financial incentives to political parties that have achieved the balanced representation of women and men on the candidate lists, etc.) to binding (change of legislation oriented towards setting the minimum share of each gender on the candidate lists and normally also the distribution method, e.g. women and men or men and women appearing in turns). The practice in this field soon proved that the situation changes more significantly only where measures are binding and their non-compliance is sanctioned (e.g. the list that does not meet the conditions is declared invalid). Such practice has been transferred by many countries into the field of economic decision-making, where the participation of women is unbalanced in view of their actual participation on the labour market and, for the most part, an obtained higher level of education than men. In this regard, the results were precisely the same as in the field of political participation, meaning: where measures are not binding and/or the non-achievement of the balance is not sanctioned, changes appear slowly or not at all. Noticeable results are reached solely by the legally prescribed minimum share of each gender - often, the term "quotas" is applied for this. Although this is a rigid measure that was firstly not favoured in the economy, experience shows that these measures compel companies to quickly recognise, develop and support appropriate female talents for their organisational management structures (Terjesen et al. 2014).

An important factor in monitoring the situation is also the prominence of (non)achieving the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions. The publication of
data on the gender composition in management and executive positions in an organisation and the achievement of the balanced representation can also be seen through the eyes of the company's social responsibility (Gonzalez Menendez et al. 2012), while the presence of women on boards can act as a promoter for the presence of women at other management levels (Gomez Anson 2012). However, we cannot expect that the higher level of women in economic decision-making positions will eliminate discriminatory organisational practices - or, as given by Korvajärvi (2012, 127): "It would be too easy to assume that women on the boards of listed companies and in other top positions have the resources to transform the oppressive and discriminatory situations in which they operate. [...] ... problems are integrated into the complexity of the relationships between gender, economy and the organizations".

### 3.3 What is being done at the EU level and by individual countries?

At the EU level, countries have been negotiating the adoption of the directive that would interfere in this field since 2012. The purpose of the directive is to significantly increase the number of women on management boards of companies in the entire EU area by determining a minimum $40 \%$ share for insufficiently represented gender in the non-executive director positions (supervisory boards) of listed companies. By means of the directive, the obligation would also be laid down for companies not achieving the balanced representation in non-executive director positions to apply the pre-determined, clear, neutrally formulated and unambiguous measures in the appointment selection procedures. The directive would apply to large listed companies (with more than 250 employees and an annual turnover of over EUR 50 million or with an annual balance sheet total over EUR 43 million). In Slovenia, there are approximately 20 such companies (there were 18 in 2012), and there are approximately 620 in the EU. Slovenia is one of the countries that supports the directive. In Slovenia, the suggested measure has, in addition to political support, also the support of the economy³: 11 of 14 participating companies would support the provision that, in the selection of non-executive directors, priority would be given to a person of insufficiently represented gender (less than $40 \%$ ), if such a person would be equally qualified as the person of opposite sex in terms of suitability, qualifications and professional experience. From those companies, in which the measure would not have been supported, one stated that they did not support the quota system since it could lead to other forms of discrimination and could push out the selection criteria or performance estimates, another opposed the legal prescription - staffing, while another one did not give any reasons at all as to why they would not have supported such a provision of the directive. In 2012, the Managers' Association of Slovenia indicated in the Guidelines for the Equality Promotion (edited by Blatnik), the absence of legal provisions, which would assure a gender balance, as the obstacle to promoting equality - thereby, this sector acknowledged the need to change the situation. Moreover, Slovenian public opinion supports the idea that, subject to equal competences, women should be equally represented in management positions in companies ( $95 \%$ of Slovenians); also, $80 \%$ of them support the legislation in this field provided that the qualifications are considered and one or other gender is not automatically favoured (Special Eurobarometer 376, Women in decision-making positions, 2012).

3 In 2012, the Equal Opportunities Department sent all Slovenian listed companies a questionnaire pertaining to their estimate on the feasibility of the directive proposal. From 20 companies in total, two did not meet the company's size criterion (namely, they had less than 251 employees), while four did not respond to the questionnaire.

The practices of individual countries to achieve the balanced representation of women and men in economic decision-making positions vary. Norway was the first in Europe to introduce quotas (2003) with the main argument being that by losing the potential of women they are losing the competitive edge on the market. Today, there are already quite a few countries in Europe that have adopted the legal measures - e.g. Denmark, Norway, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Iceland, France, Austria and Ireland. In some countries, sanctions are prescribed - e.g. an official warning, a fine, company liquidation, the achievement of quotas is taken into account in the allocation of public funds, a management board is not entitled to attendance fees if its composition is not gender balanced, etc. In some other countries, a "comply or explain" principle is established, meaning that companies have to explain their reasons for failing in case they do not achieve the prescribed shares of each gender in decision-making positions. This way, companies are forced to look for the best personnel (not composed only of male candidates, but also of female candidates) and invest in the career development of both women and men (and not - even if subconsciously - only men).

Table: Measures of the European countries to achieve the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions in the economy

| Country | Measure | Description | When |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Norway | Act | Minimum 40 \% of each gender on the management boards of publicly listed companies and of stateowned or municipally-owned companies. Failure to meet quotas results in an official warning, fine or company liquidation. | 2003 |
| Ireland | Act | State-owned companies are required to achieve a 40 $\%$ representation of each gender; the deadline to meet the objective is not set. | 2004 |
| Sweden | Self-regulation measure | The management rules for organisations include recommendation on gender balanced boards according to the "comply or explain" principle. | 2004 |
| Slovenia | Executive act | Decree regulating the criteria for implementation of the principle of balanced representation of women and men determines that among representatives appointed in public companies by the Government, there has to be a minimum of $40 \%$ of each gender, whereby the "comply or explain" principle applies. | 2004 |
| Spain | Self-regulation measure | The Corporate Governance Code recommends gender diversity in non-executive and executive director positions. | 2006 |
| Spain | Act | Encourages larger companies to change the representation in executive and non-executive director positions so as to achieve the minimum $40 \%$ of each gender. There are no fines for failure, but failure to do so is taken into account in the allocation of public funds. | 2007 |
| Denmark | Self-regulation measure | The signatories of the Charter for more women in the management of companies bind themselves to raise the share of female managers and candidates for the supervisory bodies and to increase the recruitment base by consistently working with the aim of increasing the number of women in management positions. Every two years, organisations are required to report on their progress. | 2008 |

## Country

| Finland | Executive act | Action Plan for Gender Equality determines that stateowned companies are required to have a minimum of $40 \%$ of both genders in decision-making positions; also, the government is required to observe the gender equality principle in the appointment of its representatives. | 2008 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Finland | Self-regulation measure | Organisational governance code includes the "comply or explain" rule - the obligation to provide an explanation when there is not a single woman on the board of every public company. | 2009 |
| Luxembourg | Self-regulation measure | Organisational governance rules include articles on gender equality on boards, which refer to executive and non-executive positions. | 2009 |
| Slovenia | Self-regulation measure | Management code for publicly traded companies emphasises diversity (also in terms of gender) in the composition of supervisory boards, whereby the "comply or explain" principle applies. | 2009 |
| Belgium | Self-regulation measure | The Corporate Governance Code recommends that the composition of boards is gender diversified. | 2009 |
| Austria | Self-regulation measure | The Corporate Governance Code recommends representation of both genders on supervisory boards. | 2009 |
| The Netherlands | Self-regulation measure | The Corporate Governance Code includes diversity clauses applicable to non-executive and executive director positions. | 2009 |
| Poland | Self-regulation measure | The Corporate Code recommends that listed companies ensure a gender balance in management and supervisory bodies. Companies are required to report on their compliance with this provision. | 2010 |
| Germany | Self-regulation measure | The Corporate Governance Code recommends that the management board takes diversity, in particular in terms of gender, into account in appointments to management positions | 2010 |
| Iceland | Act | Public and publicly owned companies with more than 50 employees - each gender with a minimum of $40 \%$ of positions in three or more member boards by 2013. <br> Companies with at least 25 employees are required to disclose how many women and men they employ and how many of them occupy management positions. | 2010 |
| Great Britain | Self-regulation measure | By 2015, the 100 largest companies (FTSE-100) are required to have 25 \% of women on management boards. Companies in the FTSE-350 were free to set their own share of women on boards to be achieved from 2013 to 2015. <br> Each year, the companies are required to submit data on the share of women on their boards, in higher decision-making positions and employed in organisations, while the leaders of organisations have to send out important messages on gender diversity and staffing in annual reports. | 2011 |


| Country | Measure | Description | When |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Italy | Act | Listed and state-owned companies are required to have at least $33 \%$ of each gender on management boards by 2015. Graduating fines are set for not complying with this provision - the board can also be dissolved. | 2011 |
| Austria | Act | Majority state-owned companies are required to have at least $25 \%$ of each gender on management boards by 2013 and at least $35 \%$ by 2018 . There are no sanctions for non-compliance. | 2011 |
| France | Act | All listed companies and companies with more than 500 employees are required to have $20 \%$ of each gender in non-executive director positions by 2013 and $40 \%$ by 2016. Should the target not be reached, the elections shall be annulled and the members shall not receive their attendance fees - in this way, the members who do not let women on the boards are punished, while the company is not affected. | 2011 |
| Belgium | Act | State-owned companies are required to have $1 / 3$ of each gender on executive and non-executive director positions by 2012, listed corporations by 2017, and small and medium sized listed companies and companies with less than $50 \%$ of listed shares by 2019. Sanctions for non-compliance are temporary loss of financial and non-financial benefits for the members of the boards. | 2011 |
| The Netherlands | Act | All companies with more than 250 employees and exceeding a certain level of profit are required to reach a minimum of $30 \%$ of each gender in executive and non-executive director positions. There are no sanctions, but the "comply or explain" rule applies. | 2011 |
| Portugal | Executive act | It concerns state-owned companies that are required to adopt gender equality action plans, in which the activities to promote balanced gender representation in management positions have to be defined. The Government has also recommended that listed companies adopt such plans. | 2012 |
| Denmark | Act | The largest companies are required to set themselves targets to increase the share of the less represented gender in the top management positions. | 2012 |
| Germany | Act | The act on quotas in company boards provides for a minimum of $30 \%$ representation of each gender on supervisory boards of large companies by 2016. Should the companies not find appropriate persons to fill the positions of the less represented gender, these positions in the supervisory boards will have to remain vacant. | 2015 |

Sources: European Commission, National Factsheets - Gender balance in Boards; European Parliament, Legal Instruments for Gender Quotas in Management Boards; STA (Germany)

Outside Europe, not as many countries are active in this area. Siri Terjesen et al. (2014) have made a worldwide overview of countries with legislative and softer measures. Among the countries that still have legal regulations are Israel (2007, $50 \%$ share in listed and stateowned companies; no sanctions for non-compliance) and Kenya (33 \% share in state-owned
companies, adopted in 2010, no sanctions). And, among the non-European countries that entered the self-regulation measures in the codes of organisational management are Australia (2011), Malawi (2010), Malaysia (2012), Nigeria (2011), South Africa (2009) and The Unites States of America (2010).

### 3.4 Arguments for the balanced representation of women and men in economic decision-making positions

That reducing the gap between the employment level of women and men is an important factor in economic growth has already been established by the OECD (2008). Due to numerous socio-cultural factors (e.g. exemplary set-up and accessibility of pubic childcare, system of afterschool and morning childcare in primary schools, warm meal system in primary schools, many state (and organisational) measures for the reconciliation of family and professional life, etc.), Slovenia is a state in which, according to the Eurostat data, the share of women participating in the labour market is approximately the same as that of men (working population, February 2015: 45 \% women and 55 \% men) and that they are mainly employed full time ( $86.5 \%$ in 2013), while their participation in the labour market does not decline when they become mothers (2013, employment rate of women (25-49 years) without children: $76.3 \%$, with one child younger than 6 years: 76.1 \%). There are not many countries in the European Union that would meet all the listed conditions, thus in this area, Slovenia is placed next to the countries that are ranked at the highest places on the global gender equality index and the gender equality index developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality and are, as a rule, given as an example of when good regulation of the area is discussed. However, what all these countries, including Slovenia, have in common is that, regardless of the great participation of women in the labour market, their higher education and well-regulated reconciliation of private and professional life, the women in the highest positions of economic decision-making do not account for 40 $\%$, let alone $50 \%$. Thus, numerous countries (e.g. Norway, Iceland, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany) adopted so called positive measures in this area, namely measures that enable to the gender in the worse position (women in this case) better initial opportunities than would have been available to this gender otherwise by means of special incentives or actions. In practice, the legislation proved far more effective than any kind of individual, organisational, sectoral or regional measure (Adams et al. 2013 in Terjesen et al. 2014).

Let us return to the arguments for the balanced representation of women and men in decisionmaking positions. A merely symbolic presence of women on boards does not necessary
mean that anything will change. When women are present merely symbolically, they can be perceived negatively and often they are more doubted than trusted - since they are very exposed due to their small number, they are faced with additional pressures pertaining to their results (Torchia et al. 2011), therefore it is important that the share of women is big enough to represent the so called critical mass (Catalyst 2013) - the research for Germany showed that this is around $30 \%$ (Joecks et al. 2012 in Catalyst 2013), while the other research on company boards showed that this is a minimum of three women (Erkut et al. 2008, Konrad et al. 2008 all in Torchia et al. 2011). Only then can the operation of the organisation be affected by what is brought into the organisation by women due to very different socialisation patterns, education and other social factors. Numerous foreign research (e.g. in Gonzalez Menendez et al. 2012) shows that the top European female managers are, on average, five years younger than their male colleagues (meaning that they are more familiar with the needs of a different generation).

Women often report that they had to be twice as good as the men to make their way onto the board, while the English study showed that the vast majority of non-executive director positions in the companies in the FTSE-100 were filled without the post being advertised and without an application or interview (Singh et al. 2008). The diversity of a board can improve its capability to monitor management, while new perspectives and knowledge, better creativity and new approaches improve decision-making due to a larger number of discussed different possibilities, the quality of ideas and diverse perspectives on a certain issue (Carter et al. 2007, Nielsen et al. 2009). Sabina Nielsen and Morten Huse (2009) believe that gender itself is not the one contributing to that variety, but the different individual values and professional experience of women instead, enabling them to actually influence decision-making on the management boards, whereby it is necessary that the boards offer women actual possibilities to influence matters. The authors (ibid.) point out the stereotypical notion that women are not equal members of boards, which can significantly affect their contribution to decision-making (e.g. they are given fewer opportunities to influence decisions) regardless of their values and experience, as one possible obstacle for the actual influence of women. When discussing variety, it has to be pointed out that it can also have negative consequences - e.g. due to different views, conflicts in the group can escalate (Nielsen et al. 2010, Økland in Faganelj 2015), it can have a negative impact on the dynamics and functioning of the group (Tajfel 1981, Turner 1987 - both in Nielsen et al. 2009), and it can also cause poorer identification with the group and lower satisfaction levels (Milliken and Martins 1996 in ibid.).

Silvia Gomez Anson (2012) made an overview of the European research which established a positive connection between the gender diversity of boards and the operation of the organisations as follows:

- when a woman in England is appointed to a director positon during a financial setback in the company, the value of its stocks rises (Ryan and Haslam 2005),
- Finnish listed companies that have a woman in the highest position or where at least one half of the members of the board are of female gender produce better business results than other companies (Kotiranta et al. 2007),
- those French companies that had the most women in management positions were least affected during the last economic crisis (Ferrary 2010),
- Swedish listed companies that have the most women on boards have higher profits and their profitability grows faster than in companies in which there are no women on boards (Lönnquist 2006),
- in the Netherlands, a positive connection between the presence of women on boards and the operation of those companies was proved (Lückerath-Rovers 2010),
- in the largest European companies, a positive connection between the presence of women on executive boards and the operation of those companies was proved (McKinsey \& Company Report 2007),
- in Spain, the response of the securities market to the appointment of women is positive and statistically significant, while the presence of women on boards is positively and statistically significantly linked to the operation of those companies (Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2010).

Let us add the results of the analysis of 89 European-listed companies, which achieve the highest levels of gender equality in the highest decision-making positions, to the above findings. Namely, the analysis showed that the growth of their stock value was $17 \%$ higher (2005-2007 period) in comparison to the average in their sector, while their income before
taxes was 5.3 \% higher (McKinsey \& Company 2007). Similar has been ascertained by other analyses - the larger participation of women is positively reflected on several levels as follows: the level of return on equity, operational profits, stock value, better control over management and obligations and better staffing and development for women (Bilimoria 2006, Terjesen et al. 2009 in Terjesen et al. 2014). Since 2004, the Catalyst's studies (2013) have shown that those organisations, in which the management is diversified, on average, achieve better financial results than other organisations. We also cannot ignore research that could not have established such a connection or which showed that it was even negative (e.g. Bøhren and Strøm 2005, Randøy 2006, Rose 2007 - all in Huse et al. 2009). Morten Huse et al. (2009) point out that in the business case, more than just the composition of the board and the financial operation of the organisation has to be researched, namely one should look beyond the demographic description of the boards' members, study the differences related to different tasks of the boards, include open discussions in the boards as the connecting link between the characteristics of the members of the board with the supervisory tasks of the board, and show the value of an individual member of the board (new members or those with different backgrounds will often have less value and less power and shall be considered as second-class members).

Regardless of the fact that currently most research indicates the positive connection between the share of women in the management structures and the business results, it has to be pointed out that the so called business case is not and cannot be the prevailing argument from the gender equality perspective to eliminate inequalities. Namely, the main purpose of the measures to increase balanced gender representation is to increase social justice and enable the participation of the gender that is more poorly represented in a certain field. The reasons why there are fewer women in economic decision-making positions are of several types. Roughly, they can be divided into social (e.g. prejudices and stereotypes about what appropriate posts for women and men are; an absence of measures that would encourage the economy to implement gender equality; a social climate that does not favour gender equality, etc.), organisational (e.g. procedures of the personnel selection and promotion, organisational culture, management culture and practice, organisational processes, etc.)
and personal (e.g. ambition of an individual woman, experience and qualifications, etc.). Numerous research (e.g. Gimenez Zuriaga in Spain, Smith et al. in France, Teasdale et al. in Great Britain, Lohman in Sweden, Kanjuo Mrčela in Slovenia - all in Fagan et al. (editor) 2012) has shown that the board and top management appointment procedures are often anything but transparent - thus, the competences, education, qualifications, experience or application for the advertised post are not essential for the appointment, but rather integration in nonformal networks, family and friendly connections, prior political career and similar educational or working background instead. These procedures, as one of the important obstacles for the balanced representation of women and men in management positions, have been studied in more detail in Slovenia in the research, the results of which are presented in the second part of the research report. However, on the basis of this research, it can be confirmed that non-transparent and questionable procedures from the perspective of the human resources profession are present in Slovenia and constitute a serious obstacle for enabling employment or promotion, in particular for women.

A legally prescribed minimum share of each gender forces employers to change numerous organisational practices - from better transparency of personnel selection and promotion procedures (better transparency of selection procedures and not staffing based on informal networks and acquaintances, investing in the career development of women and men in order to prevent women from getting stuck in positions where promotion to management positions is not possible) to changing the organisational culture (e.g. 24/7 availability is not expected,
awareness that employees also have obligations outside the organisation as parents, caretakers, etc.) and changing the management culture and practice (management no longer creates a culture in which women are perceived as non-members of the organisation and management authority and competences are associated solely with the male gender (Gonzalez Menendez et al. 2012, Singh et al. 2008), while consequently all this is leading to numerous changes in organisational processes (e.g. meetings are no longer organised late in the afternoon, the organisation adopts measures for the reconciliation of work and family life, etc.).

As there are many reasons to introduce a statutory minimum share of representation of women and men in decision-making positions in the economy, there are also considerations of those opposing such measures heard in public. Let us review the most common arguments that reject such considerations.

The first and most often heard consideration is that the state should not interfere in the economy. Such a consideration cannot oppose the serious estimation, whether it is evaluated from the perspective of social justice or from the economic perspective. The task of the state which has, in its highest legal document, i.e. the Constitution, enshrined the equality of women and men (Article 14), is to enter and take action in any field, in which one of the genders does not have the same initial opportunities to realise all of their potentials or there exist obstacles to their full use. The economic perspective means that it needs to be observed how much the state (taxpayers' money) invests in education and what is the result of such input. Women entering the labour market being, on average, better educated than men, but not having the same opportunities for career development and the achievement of the highest positions, means that the investment in education is not returned. Numerous studies (e.g. European Professional Women's Network 2010; Burke 2000; Hillman et al. 2000, Mattis 2000; Petreson and Philpot 2007; Terjesen et al. 2008 - all in Gonzalez Menendez et al. 2012) show that European female top managers are, as a rule, highly qualified since they have management or academic education (MBA or PhD) that is often obtained at prestigious universities. Therefore, the task of the state is not to withdraw itself and let the economy achieve the balanced representation of women and men in management positions by means of so called natural progress, but precisely the opposite: to take measures for progress to promote and enable the best personnel (among both women and men) to take over the leading positions and contribute to economic growth.

The other consideration that has already been mentioned is that the equality of women and men and their equal participation in economic decision-making should be reached by the so called natural path. Let us take a look at what that means for the European Union and Slovenia. In the European Union, there were 8.5 \% of women on the boards of the largest listed companies in 2003 and 13.7 \% in January 2012 according to the data from the European Commission. In a little more than eight years, the situation improved by 5.2 percentage points. If we had continued with such a "natural" pace, we would have come close to 40 percent, marking the beginning of the so called balanced representation, as late as after 2062. This means approximately another fifty years or two generations of employees. Equal opportunities as for her male colleague to become a top manager would thus have been expected by a female graduate entering the labour market who is yet to be born in a few decades. Now, let us also take a look at the situation in Slovenia - according to the data from the European Commission, we had $6 \%$ of female chairpersons of the boards of the largest listed companies in 2003 and $5 \%$ in 2014, and $20 \%$ of the female members of the boards both in 2003 and in 2014. In more than a decade, progress cannot be observed.

A third and commonly heard consideration of those opposing the binding measures is that the quotas are unjust and even discriminatory towards men, since they will cause women
to achieve the positions for which they are not qualified. The creation of such a stereotype was also pointed out by Silvia Moscoso et al. (2010), stating that "AAMs [afirmative action measures] could create the stereotype that those who benefit from these programs could never have succeeded on their own merits". The reversed discrimination argument reflects non-understanding of how the quota principle works - quotas never mean that women will be in the highest positions only because they are women, but instead they force employers to seek among talents they would have otherwise overlooked. Namely, the quotas work so as to enable the selection of personnel on the basis of their actual merits instead of the stereotypes of one gender, in this case women, being less appropriate for a certain position or vice versa: that being a man by itself means having certain knowledge and competences for the management position. The existence of such stereotypes can actually influence the behaviour of women and can cause the underestimation of their results (Bergeron et al. 2006 v Nielsen et al. 2009), while it also presents women as less effective members of the boards than men (Nielsen et al. 2009).

The fourth consideration of those opposing the measures to balance the representation of women and men in decision-making positions is that there are not enough appropriate and qualified female candidates to take over these positions. This consideration is understandable, but only in the short term. If a company has invested more in the career development of men, then the logical consequence is that at a certain point, they lack appropriate (and, therefore, experienced) female candidates. However, certain studies prove that women are often sufficiently qualified candidates, since they enter the labour market better educated than men, in particular, more of them have post-graduate education which is the basis for the development of independent thinking - being a key requirement for nonexecutive director positions (Roberts et al 2005 in Singh et al. 2008) and they also have a lot of experience in the public and non-profit sectors (ibid.). Often the arguments that women do not wish to occupy management positions are also observed. When companies observe this, they should ask themselves the same thing as they asked themselves in the Deutsche Bank research (2010): what is our approach lacking that we fail to invite, keep and promote women. The possible explanations are to be found in the sexist working environment, expectations that the employees not have a private life and family obligations, a management culture that sees women as the wrong gender for management positions, etc. Should the companies examine the reasons for the lack of enough qualified female candidates and properly eliminate them, they will eventually raise enough female personnel that will be able to take over the management positions. A possible reason for statements that there are no appropriate or qualified female candidates is also that employers have different criteria for women and men - for example, they expect female candidates to be much better to even consider them as possible managers. Thus, the measurement of success or evaluation of male and female candidates is not conducted according to the method with clear and measurable criteria. As one of the most developed methods, the psychometrical one is given by Willy McCourt (2001), whereby the post is analysed (work elements that are crucial for success) and what predicts the work success is defined, while the success can also be measured.

The justification of certain companies for the over-representation of men in the highest positions is also that this is an industry in which the male gender is represented in significantly larger numbers. This justification also cannot oppose more serious estimation - although this is an industry in which men significantly prevail, numerous management or executive positions are such that require education, for example, in economics, accounting or other finances, personnel management, law, etc. - in these studies, female graduates prevail. Deeply rooted stereotypes of appropriate areas of work for an individual gender are one of the key reasons for such arguments which attribute a certain characteristic (e.g. talent for
technical matters) only to one gender and thereby make access to these working areas difficult for the "wrong" gender.

Another consideration against incentive measures for the balanced representation of gender in decision-making positions is that the capable women do not require quotas since they get promoted due to their capability. The fact is that women face many obstacles in promotion precisely because they are women: the majority of obstacles are linked with the deeply rooted - often hidden - notions of what are suitable positions and professions for women. The quotas are a mechanism that helps reduce these obstacles, since it enables women to access these positions despite them being women (Kanjuo Mrčela et al. 2015). Namely, there are numerous obstacles in organisations that preclude the career development of women (glass ceiling, glass labyrinth, etc.) and often promote the career development of men (glass lift, springboard, etc.).

Usually, the last of the reasons why binding measures should not be introduced is that
companies with a higher share of women in decision-making positions will not gain anything. Although numerous research (see above) proves the positive connection between the share of women in the highest positions and the financial performance of the organisations, it should be emphasised that, from the gender equality perspective, the argument of democracy is much more important, thereby we agree with those (e.g. Kanjuo Mrčela et. al 2015) who point out that associating certain personal characteristics with an individual gender, in this case the female gender (e.g. better intuition, precision, etc.), should be avoided - diversity is important, since it increases the diversity of views on the same issue and thereby increases the chances of selecting a better approach or, as stated in the report of Lord Davies (2011): "the combined contribution of a group of people with different skills and perspectives to offer, different experiences, backgrounds and life styles and who together are more able to consider issues in a rounded, holistic way and offer an attention to detail not seen on all-male boards which often think the same way, and sometimes make poor decisions". Thus, diversity is important, because it increases the possibility of experiences of different social groups (e.g. women-men, older-younger persons, etc.) being contributed, whereby the diversity within the social groups themselves also has to be noted.

### 3.5 Preconditions for the adoption of measures for the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions

The analysis of the institutional factors that enable the adoption of legal measures for the balanced representation of women and men on management boards (Terjesen et. al 2014) has shown that the following three are crucial: the participation of women in the labour market and the measures of the welfare state, which take the aspect of gender into consideration, political coalitions that lean to the left and the inheritance of the adopted incentives in the area of gender equality policy. Slovenia, as indicated above, is one of the countries where the participation of women in the labour market is high, whereby full-time employment prevails and women mostly remain in the labour market following the birth of their children. This set also includes the exemplary regulation of parental leave (the amount and duration of parental benefit, measures to encourage men to be more involved in caregiving work, etc.), regulation of care for the elderly (home help, institutional placement, etc.) and measures to assist families with small children (system of public and concessional childcare of pre-school children, morning
childcare for young schoolchildren, after-school childcare, measures of local communities to assist parents of children attending the first triad of primary school during school breaks, regulated system of school meals, etc.). The second factor, established by Siri Terjesen et al. (2014) as crucial to change the practice in the analysis of 25 countries (10 of them with legal and 15 with self-regulation measures), were leftist government coalitions. The third established factor (ibid.) is the heritage of incentives to achieve gender equality - those countries that have adopted measures to increase the share of women in the area of political decision-making are more likely to establish such measures in the area of political decision-making.

### 3.6 Setting a minimum share of each gender and necessary accompanying measures

To legally prescribe the minimum share of each gender is a measure designed to accelerate progress in a certain field up to the level at which the measure is no longer required. In other words: in parallel with changes in legislation to achieve the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions in the economy, awareness-raising and operation in the wider area of gender equality both in organisations (the elimination of gender stereotypes, measures for the reconciliation of private and professional life, measures for the career development of women, a working environment that is friendly to women, etc.) and outside them (awareness-raising actions for public opinion support for such measures, awarenessraising about and elimination of gender stereotypes and other key reasons for gender inequality, etc.).

Based on the experience of the countries where the minimum shares of each gender have already been prescribed, it can be ascertained that they only have an impact on those management positions for which they were established (Finland Chamber of Commerce, 2013; European Women's Lobby, 2013) and that they are truly functioning only if the non-achievement of the targets is also sanctioned. Namely, the self-regulatory measures that are based on the "comply or explain" principle are not sufficiently effective in increasing the representation of women (European Women's Lobby, 2012). In establishing the minimum share of each gender in the field of political decision-making, another important factor became evident, namely that the efficiency of the measure depends on how it is formed (Schwindt-Bayer 2009). Therefore, such a measure does not indicate a magical solution. It will take time to change our values, thinking and action (Kecman and Faganelj 2015).

Our research (see next chapter) has established that the staffing/appointment procedures of management personnel are often non-transparent, which can undoubtedly have a significant influence on organisations not treating all female and male candidates according to the same criteria, and that the stereotypes of which gender is more appropriate for management and executive positions can influence the selection process. Transparent staffing procedures with pre-determined selection criteria and measures reduce staffing based on stereotypes and give opportunities also to the personnel that otherwise would not have the opportunity to show their potential.

The transparent politics of management personnel employment requires that the criteria are set in advance and clearly presented in an advertisement for the post and its description, and the candidates estimated solely according to these criteria (Slezak 2012). Thus, the criteria should be consistent, transparent and one-dimensional, and there is no excuse for the organisations
for the ethical consequences of a lack of transparency in the staffing procedure (Finkelman 2010). The numerous authors (e.g. Ledwith and Manfredi 2000, Rees 2004, Academy of Finland 1998, Allen 1988, Husu 2000, Zieger 2001, Martin 1994 - all in Brink et al. 2010) state that women would gain by even more open and transparent procedures of (management) staffing, since the (gender) bias more likely appears when the estimation is based on hidden criteria and when the estimation procedure is confidential. From the transparency perspective, it is also important that the reasons for the adopted decisions in the recruitment procedure are documented and that candidates have transparent appeal procedures available if not satisfied with not being selected (Slezak 2012).

Among the most important measures for the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions, the following were given by Sylvia Walby (2013): programmes of training, mentoring and sponsoring for the development of female talents; awards and recognitions that promote and reward organisational good practices; databases of women interested in the positions on boards and codes with self-regulation measures. Rachel Zupek Farrell (2012) also listed a few myths that have an impact on the talent development programmes not being applied by numerous organisations - one of them is that only large organisations need such programmes. The author refuted the myth with the fact that smaller organisations might lose a lot more if they cannot recognise and keep the best personnel since losing one single talent in a smaller organisation would cause a larger deficit than in a larger organisation.

Gender diversity of the committees was proven to be an important factor of recruitment in the academic world - analysis of 971 reports on the appointment of full professors in the Netherlands showed an important connection between the number of female committee members and the gender of the selected person - the more women there were in the committee, the bigger the probability was of a woman being selected. The same research confirmed that diversely composed committees (in terms of the position, gender and function) increase the transparency of the committees' work and reduce the decision-making power of the narrow circle of white men (Brink et al. 2010). One of the guidelines of the Managers' Association of Slovenia for the encouragement of equality in companies (Blatnik et al. 2012) is also that in the final selection of the potential three candidates for a certain management position (when the candidates are of both genders), at least one of them is a woman. A similar recommendation would also be beneficiall for the committees that select these personnel, but some authors (e.g. Brink et al. 2010) justifiably point out that it is not enough that women are added to the committee without the aspect of gender in the organisational practices being addressed and thereby the masculinised norms changed, in particular those that define the quality of a candidate.

In summary: the statutory regulation of the minimum share of each gender is an efficient measure, but its implementation in practice has to be backed up both with awareness-raising on the harmfulness of gender stereotypes, actions for their elimination and measures at the level of organisations (from transparent selection procedures to measures for personnel development with an emphasis on the less represented gender, and other measures to strengthen gender equality at the organisational level).


## 4. Research results

In continuation, the results of the survey conducted on a sample of 543 organisations of the private and public sectors in Slovenia are presented.

### 4.1 Sample

Considering the legal organisational form, most of the 543 participating organisations were from the public sector (76 \% in total), whereby most of them were public institutes. Among the economic organisations (21 \% in total), limited liability companies prevail. Considering the activities according to the Standard Classification of Activities, the organisations from the area of education (41 \%) prevail among participants from the public sector, followed by the activities of public administration, defence and compulsory social security ( $23 \%$ ), while most of the participants from the economy are from the area of manufacturing ( $8 \%$ ) and are followed by those from the area of other service activities (5 \%). Considering ownership, the majority of participants are publicly owned (78 \%), followed by those owned by private domestic capital (16 \%). In the sample, organisations that have already existed for at least 10 years and those that have more than 51 employees prevail (61 \% in total).

| Legal organisational form | Number | Share (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 50 | 9.2 |
| Limited liability company | 63 | 11.6 |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 86 | 15.8 |
| Local community | 54 | 9.9 |
| Public institute | 271 | 49.9 |
| Society, association, union of associations, private institute, institution, foundation, cooperative | 13 | 2.4 |
| Sole proprietor | 1 | 0.2 |
| Other | 5 | 0.9 |
| Total | 543 | 100.0 |
| Ownership | Number | Share (\%) |
| Publicly owned | 421 | 77.5 |
| Partially publicly and partially privately owned | 13 | 2.4 |
| Privately owned - domestic capital | 85 | 15.7 |
| Privately owned - foreign capital | 19 | 3.5 |
| Privately owned - partially domestic and partially foreign capital | 5 | 0.9 |
| Total | 543 | 100.0 |


| Existence of organisation | Number | Share (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Up to and including 1 year | 1 | 0.2 |
| From more than 1 to 5 years inclusive | 8 | 1.5 |
| From more than 5 to 10 years inclusive | 20 | 3.7 |
| More than 10 years | 514 | 94.7 |
| Total | 543 | 100.0 |


| Main activity according to the Standard Classification of Activities | Number | Share (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Agriculture and hunting | 4 | 0.7 |
| Information and communication | 5 | 0.9 |
| Financial and insurance activities | 9 | 1.7 |
| Professional, scientific and technical activities | 4 | 0.7 |
| Public administration and defence, compulsory social security | 123 | 22.7 |
| Education | 224 | 41.3 |
| Human health and social work activities | 71 | 13.1 |
| Arts, entertainment and recreation | 2 | 0.4 |
| Other service activities | 29 | 5.3 |
| Manufacturing | 41 | 7.6 |
| Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply | 2 | 0.4 |
| Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities | 3 | 0.6 |
| Construction | 5 | 0.9 |
| Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles | 15 | 2.8 |
| Transportation and storage | 5 | 0.9 |
| Accommodation and food service activities | 1 | 0.2 |
| Total | 543 | 100.0 |


| Size of organisation | Number | Share (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Without employees | 1 | 0.2 |
| From 1 to 10 employees inclusive | 42 | 7.7 |
| From 11 to 50 employees inclusive | 170 | 31.3 |
| From 51 to 250 employees inclusive | 253 | 46.6 |
| 250 or more employees | 77 | 14.2 |
| Total | 543 | 100.0 |

### 4.2 Representation of gender in organisation and in management positions

In the light of balanced gender representation, only $12 \%$ of organisations fall within the so called balanced area, while organisations in which women are overrepresented prevail (73 \% in total), which was expected considering that the organisations of the public sector prevail in the sample.

The lowest share of organisations, in which women prevail among all employees (> $60 \%$ ), is among the participating joint-stock companies - $16 \%$, followed by limited liability companies - $30 \%$, and in the public sector, among local communities - $65 \%$, public institutes $90 \%$ and state authorities including the offices of the prosecutor and courts $91 \%$.

Among the organisations of the private sector, $28 \%$ of organisations in the case of joint-stock companies and $14 \%$ of organisations in the case of limited liability companies fall within the balanced area. In the public sector, $4 \%$ of organisations are among state authorities, the offices of the prosecutor and courts, $32 \%$ among local communities and $7 \%$ among public institutes, in which the share of women or men among all employees is not lower than $40 \%$ and not higher than $60 \%$.

Among the organisations, in which men are overrepresented, there are $56 \%$ of organisations in the case of joint-stock companies and limited liability companies, $6 \%$ in the case of state authorities, the offices of the prosecutor and courts, $4 \%$ in the case of local communities and $3 \%$ in the case of public institutes.

Table: Share of women among all employees

|  | Share of women among all employees | Number of organisations | Share (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Underrepresentation of women among all employees <br> (15 \% of all organisations) | Up to and including 10 \% | 13 | 2.4 |
|  | Between 11 and 20 \% | 27 | 5.0 |
|  | Between 21 and $30 \%$ | 23 | 4.2 |
|  | Between 31 and 40 \% | 18 | 3.3 |
| Area of balanced representation of women and men <br> (12 \% of all organisations) | Between 21 and $50 \%$ | 31 | 5.7 |
|  |  |  |  |
| Overrepresentation of women among all employees | Between 61 and 70 \% | 48 | 8.8 |
|  | Between 71 and $80 \%$ | 86 | 15.8 |
|  | Between 81 and $90 \%$ | 150 | 27.6 |
| (73 \% of all organisations) | 91 \% or more | 114 | 21.0 |
|  | Total | 543 | 100.0 |

We were interested in whether, in the participating organisations, they ever had a woman in the highest decision-making position (e.g. chairperson of the board, director, head of the organisation) - in total, $71 \%$ of organisations replied affirmatively. We asked these organisations when this took place - currently, in total $49 \%$ of the organisations have a woman in the highest decision-making position, $11 \%$ of the organisations had her in the last five years, while the same share applies for a woman leading the organisation before that period.

Considering the organisational form, differences between the private and public sectors exist - in the case of joint-stock companies, $76 \%$ of the participating organisations had never had a woman in the highest decision-making position, in the case of limited liability companies $60 \%$, in the case of state authorities including the offices of the prosecutor and courts $15 \%$ and in the case of local communities $41 \%$. Women currently lead $8 \%$ of the participating jointstock companies, and the same share applies for the period of the last five years and before that period. In the case of limited liability companies, $21 \%$ are currently led by a woman, 13 $\%$ were led by a woman in the period of the last five years and $6 \%$ before that period. In the case of the participating state authorities, the offices of the prosecutor and courts, $65 \%$ are currently led by a woman, $14 \%$ were led by a woman in the period of the last five years and 6 \% before that period. In the case of the participating local communities, $33 \%$ currently have a woman in the highest decision-making position ${ }^{4}, 15 \%$ had a woman in the highest decisionmaking position in the period of the last five years and $11 \%$ before that period. In the case of the participating public institutes, 62 \% are currently led by a woman, $9 \%$ were led by a woman in the period of the last five years and $15 \%$ before that period.

Figure: When did you have a woman in the highest decision-making position in your organisation?


[^3]
### 4.3 Working environment

An important aspect of gender equality is also the working environment - it can be such that for one gender (usually men) it constitutes a springboard for career development and for the other (usually women) it creates many (non)visible obstacles. Thus, we were interested in what the working environments in the participating organisations are like from the perspective of those factors that can constitute reasons for the underrepresentation of women in decisionmaking positions. The respondents expressed their agreement on a five-grade scale (I strongly disagree - I disagree - I neither agree nor disagree - I agree - I strongly agree).

Among all possible organisational obstacles, we focused on two of them, namely on the general expectation that the employed persons are present in the workplace beyond fulltime working hours and on such expectation towards the leaders. The difference between such expectation towards the employees and towards the leaders was demonstrated. In total, $41 \%$ of the participating organisations expressed a certain level of agreement that in their organisations, presence beyond full-time working hours is expected from leaders, and 27 \% that the same applies for the employees.

Figure: Level of agreement that working beyond full-time working hours is expected of all employees and for management


Thereby, differences between the organisations of the private and public sectors exist - in general, they more often agree in the private sector that both the employees and leaders are expected to stay in workplace beyond full-time working hours.

Table: Level of agreement that working beyond full-time working hours is expected of all employees and of leaders by organisational form

|  | In our organisation, the employees are expected to stay in the workplace beyond full-time working hours |  | In our organisation, the leaders are expected to stay in the workplace beyond full-time working hours |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | I do not agree | I agree | I do not agree | I agree |
| Joint-stock company | 35.4\% | 31.2\% | 22.9\% | 54.2\% |
| Limited liability company | 31.2\% | 39.3\% | 21.3\% | 52.5\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 57.6\% | 11.8\% | 51.2\% | 27.9\% |
| Local community | 28.8\% | 42.3\% | 20.7\% | 52.9\% |
| Public institute | 50.8\% | 24.2\% | 37.9\% | 37.4\% |

The other set of obstacles was the perceived sexist working environment - e.g. the existence of unwritten rules that men are more suitable for the top management positions (chairperson of the board, director of the organisation and head of the organisation), an environment that is, in general, unkind to women and the existence of closed male networks. The highest level of agreement is found in response to the statement that in their organisation, there are unwritten rules that men are more suitable for the top management positions - $11 \%$ of participants and the lowest level regarding the statement that in their organisation, there are closed male networks - $5 \%$ of the participants - while $6 \%$ of them agree with the statement that in their organisation, the environment is, in general, unkind to women.

Figure: Level of agreement with statements on the existence of a sexist working environment


Also for this set of questions, differences between the private and public sectors were demonstrated. In the private sector, where approximately one half of organisations is such that women represent from 0 to $40 \%$ of all employees and where a majority of the organisations do not have a woman in the highest decision-making position, the responses, showing agreement with the statements that there are unwritten rules that men are more suitable for the top management positions, are more frequent ( $26 \%$ of joint-stock companies and $12 \%$ of limited liability companies); the high level of agreement is also expressed in local communities - 19 $\%$. That the working environment in their organisation is, in general, unkind to women is, in the largest share, agreed by the participant joint-stock companies (11 \%), followed by the local communities (9\%), while the lowest level of agreement was expressed in the state authorities ( $4 \%$ ). The statement that there are closed male networks in their organisation is, in the largest share, agreed by the participating limited liability companies (11 \%), followed by the joint-stock companies ( $9 \%$ ), while the smallest share of those agreeing with such a statement can be found among the public institutes (2 \%).

Table: Level of agreement with the statement on the existence of a sexist working environment by organisational form

|  | In our organisation, there are unwritten rules that men are more suitable for the top management positions. |  | In our organisation, the environment is, in general, unkind to women. |  | In our organisation, there are closed male networks. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | I disagree | I agree | I disagree | I agree | I disagree | I agree |
| Delniška družba | 59.6\% | 25.5\% | 74.5\% | 10.6\% | 78.7\% | 8.6\% |
| Družba z omejeno odgovornostjo | 72.1\% | 11.5\% | 75.9\% | 6.4\% | 80.6\% | 11.3\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 83.5\% | 4.7\% | 84.9\% | 3.5\% | 90.7\% | 3.5\% |
| Lokalna skupnost | 66.7\% | 18.6\% | 83.3\% | 9.3\% | 86.6\% | 5.8\% |
| Javni zavod | 85.2\% | 7.9\% | 90.3\% | 5.6\% | 93.5\% | 2.3\% |

We have linked the wider set of possible obstacles with the transparency and ethics of the personnel selection criteria and the attitude of organisations towards these issues. Thus, in relation to the transparency of procedures, we were interested in the level of agreement with the statements that recruitment to the highest positions in the participating organisations is affected by politics, that family and friendly connections are applied for recruitment to middle or lower management posts and that the staffing procedures in the participating organisation are transparent (i.e. not hidden).

That recruitment to the highest positions in their organisation is affected by politics was agreed upon by $24 \%$ of all participating organisations, while the share of undefined was high (18 \%). It was also expected that the high level of agreement with the statement that the staffing
procedures are transparent in their organisation would be expressed by the participants - 82 $\%$ of them agree, $8 \%$ are undefined, while $10 \%$ disagree with the said statement. Agreement with the statement that, in their organisation, the relatives or persons from the friendly circles of the employees are recruited to non-management positions was expressed by $6 \%$ of participating organisations; the same share agrees that persons from this and collegial circles of the top management are recruited to the middle management posts; slightly less - $5 \%$ agree that persons from these networks of the middle and top managements are recruited to the lower management posts.

Figure: Level of agreement with statements on transparency and ethics of the personnel selection criteria


As expected, here also differences between the private and public sectors and between individual organisational forms exist. Most of those expressing agreement that recruitment to the highest positions in their organisation is affected by politics are from the state authorities, including the courts and offices of the prosecutors - $42 \%$, followed by the local communities - $39 \%$, and the least of those agreeing with such a statement are among the limited liability companies - $3 \%$; the influence of politics on recruitment to the highest positions is also not negligible among the joint-stock companies - where $17 \%$ agree with this statement. We were also interested in the level of agreement with the statements that persons from the pool of friendly, collegial or family networks are recruited to different position levels - that in this way recruitment to the non-management posts takes place is, in the largest share, agreed by local communities - $11 \%$, followed by the joint-stock companies - $9 \%$, while the least of such recruitment was observed in the public institutes - $5 \%$. The highest share of participants agreeing that persons from the family, collegial or friendly networks of the top management are recruited to the middle management is among the local communities (11 \%) and joint-stock companies (11 \%), and the lowest among the public institutes (3 \%). That persons from the collegial, friendly or family circles of the top management are recruited to lower management posts is, in the largest share, agreed by the participating joint-stock companies - $11 \%$, followed by the state authorities including the offices of the prosecutor and courts - $9 \%$, while the least of those agreeing with such a statement was expressed by the participating public institutes - $2 \%$. The last statement within this set related to expressing the level of agreement with the statement that the staffing procedures in the organisation
are transparent, i.e. not hidden. Most of the agreement with this statement was expressed in the public institutes - $87 \%$, and the least in the joint-stock companies $-64 \%$. The largest share of those undefined as regards this statement - almost one third (32 \%) - was from the joint-stock companies, while a significant share of the undefined was also among the limited liability companies - $17 \%$. Most of the disagreement with this statement was expressed by the participating state authorities - $17 \%$ of them disagree.

Table: The level of agreement with statements on transparency and ethics of the personnel selection criteria by organisational form

|  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |


| Joint-stock company | 71.7\% | 17.3\% | 68.1\% | 8.5\% | 76.1\% | 10.9\% | 76.1\% | 10.8\% | 4.4\% | 63,9\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Limited liability company | 83.3\% | 3.4\% | 78.4\% | 6.6\% | 78.7\% | 6.5\% | 78.3\% | 5.0\% | 7.4\% | 75.9\% |


| State authority, <br> office of the <br> prosecutor, <br> court |
| :--- |

Regarding the ethics and attitude towards it, we examined the level of agreement with the statements that in the participating organisation, high ethical commitments apply and that the top management is sending out clear messages that the issues of integrity/ethics/ anti-corruption are high on the scale of values of their organisation. In total, regardless of the organisational form, a certain level of agreement with the statement that the top management of an organisation is sending out clear messages that the issues of integrity/ethics/corruption prevention are high on the scale of values of their organisation was expressed by $75 \%$ of the participating organisations, and disagreement by $10 \%$ of them. Regarding the statement that high ethical commitments apply in their organisation, agreement was expressed by $65 \%$ of
the participating organisations, $12 \%$ of them expressed disagreement, and slightly less than one quarter (23 \%) were undefined.

Figure: Level of agreement with statements on ethics, integrity issues and prevention of corruption


In terms of the organisational form, differences between the private and public sectors are also noticed within this set of questions. In general, the share of organisations that agree with both statements is lower in the private sector - that high ethical commitments apply in their organisation is agreed by $56 \%$ of the joint-stock companies and by $55 \%$ of the limited liability companies. The highest level of agreement in the public sector is expressed by the public institutes - $70 \%$. The level of disagreement is the highest among the joint-stock companies (18 \%), followed by the local communities (13 \%) and state authorities (13 \%). The highest level of agreement with the statement that the top management is sending out clear messages that the issues of integrity/ethics/corruption prevention are high on the scale of organisational values was expressed by the public institutes ( $82 \%$ ), and the lowest by the joint stock companies ( 57 \%). The highest level of disagreement can be found among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts - $16 \%$ - and the lowest among the public institutes - $7 \%$.

Table: Level of agreement with the statements on ethics, issues of integrity and prevention of corruption by organisational form

|  | In our organisation, high ethical commitments apply. |  | Regarding the issues of integrity/ ethics/corruption prevention, the top management is sending out clear messages that these values are high on the scale of values of our organisation. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | I disagree | I agree | I disagree | I agree |
| Joint-stock company | 17.8\% | 55.5\% | 13.6\% | 56.8\% |
| Limited liability company | 12.1\% | 55.1\% | 11.2\% | 63.0\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 12.7\% | 65.8\% | 15.8\% | 73.7\% |
| Local community | 13.4\% | 61.6\% | 12.0\% | 62.0\% |
| Public institute | 8.9\% | 70.3\% | 6.5\% | 82.3\% |

### 4.4 Transparency in the staffing procedures

An important part of the research was dedicated to issues of staffing procedures - above all, we were interested in how transparent they are. Firstly, we asked the participants whether they would, in general, say that for their organisation the staffing procedures are transparent, whereby transparent operation was defined as the evident, public and unhidden operation of an authority, organisation and legal or natural person. The vast majority (93 \%) of the participants expressed an opinion that the staffing procedures in their organisation are, in general, transparent (responses true and very true). Considering the organisational form, slightly fewer participants agreed with the said statement in joint-stock companies (90 \%), limited liability companies (89 \%) and state authorities (94 \%), while an above-average level of agreement was expressed in the local communities (94 \%) and public institutes (96 \%).

Figure: Yes, for my organisation I would, in general, say that the staffing procedures are transparent.


Our next set of questions referred to the estimate of how much certain possible grounds for transparent staffing procedures hold true for their organisation. The participating persons expressed the highest level of disagreement (responses not true at all and not true) with the statement that persons who decide on staffing are aware that it is hard to expect high ethical standards from disputably recruited persons (e.g. backdoor staffing, recruitment of relatives, etc.) - $5 \%$. The highest share of those not agreeing is among the participating state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts - $8 \%$, and the smallest among the public institutes $-4 \%$. On the other hand, there are those expressing disagreement - $83 \%$ among all participants, the most of them among the local communities - $90 \%$, and the least among the joint-stock companies $-74 \%$. The next possible grounds were that persons who decide on staffing are aware that by employing relatives or political colleagues or colleagues from schooling/studying days they would have limited the possibility of selecting the best personnel available in a certain moment on the labour market - $5 \%$ of participants do not agree with the said statement. The most of those who do not agree are among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts - $6 \%$, and the least among the limited liability companies $-2 \%$. The most of those who do agree were found among the local communities - $90 \%$, and the least among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts - $78 \%$. As possible grounds for transparent staffing it was also given that persons who decide on staffing are aware that the transparent personnel selection procedure means selection of the best possible personnel - on average, $3 \%$ of
all participating organisations does not agree with the said statement, most of them among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts - $5 \%$, and the least among the public institutes - $2 \%$. Agreement was expressed by $88 \%$ of the participating organisations - the most among the local communities - $94 \%$, and the least among the jointstock companies - 77 \%. As the next possible grounds, it was given that persons who decide on staffing respect legislation - $2 \%$ of all participants do not agree with the said statement - the lowest share is among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts - $1 \%$, and the highest among the joint-stock companies - $4 \%$. On the other hand, there are those agreeing with the said statement - $92 \%$ of the participants. The highest share is among those that come from the local communities - $96 \%$, and the lowest among the jointstock companies - $81 \%$. As the last possible grounds, we gave the statement that persons who decide on staffing have high ethical standards in the field of staffing - $4 \%$ of the participants do not agree with the said statement, whereby the highest share is among those that come from the joint-stock companies - $8 \%$, and the lowest among the local communities - 2 \%. However, $87 \%$ of the participants agree with the statement, the most of them among the local communities - $94 \%$, and the least among the joint-stock companies - $77 \%$.

Figure: Please, estimate to what extent the statements, in general, hold true for your organisation - merged responses "not true at all" and "not true"


Table: Please estimate to what extent the statements, in general, hold true for your organisation - merged responses "very true" and "true"

For my organisation, the statement, in general, is very true or true.


[^4]Persons who decide on staffing are aware that by employing relatives or political colleagues or colleagues from schooling/ $\begin{array}{llllll}\text { studying days they would have limited the } \quad 85.6 \% \quad 79.6 \% & 88.0 \% & 78.2 \% & 90.2 \% & 97,5 \%\end{array}$ possibility of selecting the best personnel available in a certain moment on the labour market.

Persons who decide on staffing are aware that the transparent personnel selection procedure means selection of the best $87.8 \% \quad 77.1 \% \quad 84.5 \% \quad 82,9 \% \quad 94,3 \% \quad 91,3 \%$ possible personnel.

| Persons who decide on staffing respect the legislation. | 91.7\% | 80.9\% | 90.0\% | 86.8\% | 96.0\% | 94.2\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Persons who decide on staffing have high ethical standards in the field of staffing. | 87.4\% | 77.1\% | 84.5\% | 84.2\% | 94.1\% | 89.7\% |

The control system that examines the staffing procedures from the transparency perspective is one of the possible risk reducers for disputable staffing procedures, thus we were interested in whether there was such a control system introduced in the organisations. The majority of the organisations ( $57 \%$ ) responded that they did not have such a system, while the highest share of such responses was among the limited liability companies - $71 \%$, and the lowest among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts - 27 \%. In this organisational form, there is also the largest share of those that have such a control system introduced for all cases - $38 \%$. More rarely such a response was chosen by the organisations of the private sector $-16 \%$ of participants in the case of the limited liability companies; the same applies for the joint-stock companies. The highest share ( $24 \%$ ) of the participants among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, responded that such a control system is only introduced in cases of appeal, while none of the limited liability companies responded in the same way. The highest share of participants among the joint-stock companies ( $12 \%$ ) responded that this is so in randomly selected cases; the lowest was among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts.

Table: Is there a control system introduced that examines the staffing procedures from the transparency perspective?

|  | No | Yes, for all cases | Yes, only in cases of appeal | Yes, for randomly selected cases | Other |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 64.0\% | 16.0\% | 6.0\% | 12.0\% | 2.0\% |
| Limited liability company | 71.4\% | 15.9\% | .0\% | 6.3\% | 6.3\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 26.7\% | 38.4\% | 24.4\% | 2.3\% | 8.1\% |
| Local community | 53.7\% | 24.1\% | 9.3\% | 7.4\% | 5.6\% |
| Public institute | 61.3\% | 21.4\% | 7.7\% | 4.4\% | 5.2\% |

We asked those that have such a control system introduced who implements it - the most frequently given response was that this is a committee (e.g. the recruitment committee, appeal committee appointed by a superior, etc.), director or head or that it is implemented in an audit).

We were also interested in whether the participants consider such control necessary - the majority (42 \%) responded that it is not. The next group was of the opinion that it is necessary occasionally ( $33 \%$ ), followed by those of the opinion that it is always necessary (25 \%). The most of those that are not inclined to the control system are among the limited liability companies (57 \%), and the least among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts ( $22 \%$ ). In this organisational form, there are also the most of those of the opinion that such control would have always been necessary ( $44 \%$ ), while the least of so opinionated are among the limited liability companies ( $5 \%$ ). The most of participants among the joint-stock companies ( $40 \%$ ) and the least among the local communities ( $26 \%$ ) are inclined to occasional control.

Table: Do you consider that such control would be necessary?

| Yo | Yes, always |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Occasionally |  |$|$

To the question of whether somebody has in the last five years pointed out non-transparent recruitment to the management positions in the participating organisation in case a woman was a more suitable candidate than a man, but the man was appointed to the position, the majority of the participants ( $86 \%$ ) responded " No ". The highest share of those that responded "Yes, informally (rumours, orally, etc.)" was among the joint-stock companies (10 \%) and public institutes (8 \%), and the lowest among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (4 \%) and local communities; the highest share of
those that responded with "Yes, formally (written complaint, etc.)" was among the joint-stock companies (4 \%), and the lowest among the limited liability companies, where this response was not marked by any of the participating persons.

Figure: Has, in the last five years, anybody pointed out the non-transparent recruitment to the management positions in your organisation in case a woman was a more suitable candidate than a man, but the man was appointed to the position?


### 4.5 Discriminatory and non-transparent staffing

We presented two hypothetical examples of staffing to the participants and asked them to estimate for each one how such a method of selection, in general, would be perceived in their organisation and not by them personally. Let us take a closer look at them.

## Example 1: Discriminatory staffing

In your organisation, there was an internal vacancy notice for the head of department $X$. Marko and Mateja are the final two candidates. They both have education in the same discipline; she has obtained a Master of Science degree and he a university degree. They were both assessed as excellent by their superior in the annual interviews and they both passed the tests with an above average grade, whereby Mateja was slightly better than Marko. Mateja has a slightly bigger support of the collective. About their personal life, it is known that Marko is 45 years old, has two adult children, is married and enjoys sport; Mateja is 33 years old, has one 3-year-old child and wishes to have more, is married and ambitious.

In the final phase, who will be the head of department $X$ is decided by the head of the service. The head selected Marko on the grounds that Mateja would not have been as dedicated to the work as Marko, since she would go on maternity leave anyway.

Although, according to the opinion of the participants, such a discriminatory method of staffing would, in general, be perceived in their organisations as very unacceptable (22 \%) or unacceptable ( $43 \%$ ), on the other hand, there are quite a few of those who believe that it would have been perceived as acceptable ( $9 \%$ ) or even very acceptable ( $3 \%$ ). There are significant differences between the private and public sectors - among the joint-stock companies, there are as many as $30 \%$ of participating organisations, in which, according to the opinion of the respondents, such a method of staffing would have been perceived as (very) acceptable, among the limited liability companies $17 \%$, state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts 16 $\%$, local communities $13 \%$ and among the public institutes $8 \%$. The highest proportion of the responses (very) unacceptable was selected by the public institutes ( $71 \%$ ), followed by the local communities (67 \%), state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (61 \%), joint-stock companies (56 \%) and limited liability companies (41 \%).

Figure: Estimate of the respondents of how such a selection method would, in general, be perceived in their organisations


## Example 2: Non-transparent staffing

In your organisation, a public vacancy notice for a post in department $Y$ was published. The procedure is composed of several phases, whereby Neli was the best in all the phases, while Janez always came second. During the procedure, Neli informs the committee of being pregnant. On the grounds of the assessments from individual phases, the committee selected Neli and suggested that the management conclude the employment contract with her. Despite this, the management invited Neli and Janez to be interviewed. Unofficially it does this because Neli is pregnant and - regardless of her references and capabilities - it does not wish to employ a person leaving for parental leave. Officially, because management wishes to have a possibility of selection among more persons.

In another selection procedure, recently carried out by your organisation, only one candidate was proposed to the management on its request, the management conducted an interview only with him, with whom it also concluded the employment relationship.

The decision regarding Neli and Janez is not known yet.

Compared to the first example, involving very obvious gender discrimination, the second case, in which the final decision on selection is not yet known, but we do know that the selection procedure was, due to the candidate's pregnancy, different from the case in which gender obviously did not play any role in the selection, the shares of those who consider that such a selection method would, in general, be perceived in their organisation as acceptable are higher - $3 \%$ estimate that it would be very acceptable and $17 \%$ that it would be acceptable. Significantly lower are the shares of those that consider such a selection procedure as very acceptable (11 \%) or acceptable (30 \%). Also in connection with this question, important differences between the private and public sector exists - the private one expresses higher shares of such a staffing method being estimated as acceptable. Such a personnel selection procedure was marked as, in general, (very) acceptable in their organisation by $40 \%$ of the participating limited liability companies and $36 \%$ of joint-stock companies. In the public sector, the highest share was reached in the state authorities, including the courts and offices of the prosecutor (22 \%), followed by the local communities ( $17 \%$ ), while the lowest level of agreement was reached in the public institutes (12 \%). On the other hand, the shares of such a staffing method being estimated as unacceptable are, in general, lower in comparison with the first example - the highest share in responses that such a staffing method would, in general, be perceived as (very) unacceptable in their organisation was expressed by the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (49 \%), followed by the local communities (46 \%) and public institutes (45 \%). In the private sector, the shares among the joint-stock companies (24 \%) and limited liability companies (22 \%) are considerably lower. However, in this hypothetical example of staffing, the shares of those undefined are higher in comparison with the first example - from 43 \% among the public institutes to $29 \%$ among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts.

Figure: Estimate of the respondents of how such a selection method would, in general, be perceived in their organisations


### 4.6 Methods of middle management staffing

A middle management post presents a springboard for higher positions, thus special attention was given to the staffing method for this level of management. We were interested in the participants' estimate of how often the selected practices take place in their organisations.

The publication of internal vacancy notices is, in general, rarer than the publication of public vacancy notices. Internal vacancy notices for middle management are more often published by the private sector (36 \%) than the public one (27 \%). Public notices are more often published by the public sector (79 \%) than the private one (57 \%). We were also interested in how often the notices are not published by the organisations, when the pre-selected candidate has outstandingly good competences - this happens more often in the private (30 \%) than the public sector (11 \%). The share of those who estimated the selection procedure as (almost) always being mere formality, since the candidate is typically selected in advance, was higher in the public (15 \%) than the private sector (14 \%). Also, sometimes the requirements for filling a vacancy are adjusted to the pre-selected candidate - that this is (almost) always the case was more frequently estimated by the public sector (5 \%) than the private one (4 \%). Nepotism or the assignment of posts on the grounds of family ties was observed - somewhat more frequently in the private sector (6 \%) than in the public one (3 \%). That recruitment to these posts is (almost) always based on the personal selection of the superior to the future middle manager was more often estimated in the private (19 \%) than the public (12 \%) sector; the same applies for the statement that the formal or unwritten criteria are more adjusted to persons without family obligations (private sector slightly over $5 \%$, private sector slightly under 5 \%), men (private sector $7 \%$, public sector $2 \%$ ) or women (private sector $2 \%$, public sector $1 \%$ ).

| This is the case in our organisation ... | ... (almost) never |  | ... (almost) always |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Private sector | Public sector | Private sector | Public sector |
| Internal vacancy notice is published. | 32.7\% | 53.6\% | 35.6\% | 27.1\% |
| Public vacancy notice is published. | 16.8\% | 11.1\% | 57.4\% | 79.2\% |
| When the pre-selected candidate has outstandingly good competences, the notice is not published. | 41.4\% | 80.0\% | 30.3\% | 10.8\% |
| Selection procedure is a mere formality, since the candidate is typically selected in advance. | 56.3\% | 88.6\% | 13.6\% | 14,9\% |
| The requirements for filling a vacancy are adjusted to the pre-selected candidate. | 83.5\% | 87.7\% | 3.9\% | 4.8\% |
| Nepotism (the assignment of posts or other favours on the grounds of family ties). | 76.0\% | 89.4\% | 5.8\% | 2.7\% |
| Recruitment to these posts is based on the personal selection of the superior to the future middle manager. | 32.7\% | 72.5\% | 19.4\% | 12.2\% |
| Formal or unwritten criteria are more adjusted to persons without family obligations. | 80.6\% | 91.1\% | 5.1\% | 4.6\% |
| Formal or unwritten criteria are more adjusted to men. | 79.4\% | 94.2\% | 6.9\% | 2.4\% |
| Formal or unwritten criteria are more adjusted to women. | 87.3\% | 95.4\% | 2.0\% | 1.2\% |

In the following tables, the results are presented in more detail by individual organisational forms, whereby also the responses that the listed actions only occasionally take place in the organisations are included.
Internal vacancy notice is published.
Never
Almost

never Occasionally | Almost |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| always | Always

| When the pre-selected candidate has outstandingly good competences, the notice is not published. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 29.8\% | 14.9\% | 23.4\% | 14.9\% | 17.0\% |
| Limited liability company | 21.2\% | 17.3\% | 32.7\% | 17.3\% | 11.5\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 70.3\% | 10.8\% | 9.5\% | 4.1\% | 5.4\% |
| Local community | 66.7\% | 14.8\% | 7.4\% | 7.4\% | 3.7\% |
| Public institute | 72.3\% | 7.1\% | 9.4\% | 4.9\% | 6.3\% |
| Total | 60.4\% | 10.4\% | 13.8\% | 7.6\% | 7.8\% |


| Selection procedure is a mere formality, since the candidate is typically selected in advance. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 19.1\% | 36.2\% | 27.7\% | 10.6\% | 6.4\% |
| Limited liability company | 25.0\% | 32.1\% | $32.1 \%$ | 8.9\% | 1.8\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 54.7\% | 13.3\% | 16.0\% | 9.3\% | 6.7\% |
| Local community | 37.0\% | 33.3\% | 18.5\% | 7.4\% | 3.7\% |
| Public institute | 44.3\% | 24.1\% | 21.5\% | 7.0\% | 3.1\% |
| Total | 40.2\% | 25.3\% | 22.6\% | 8.1\% | 3.8\% |


| The requirements for filling a vacancy are adjusted to the pre-selected candidate. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 41.7\% | 37.5\% | 16.7\% | 2.1\% | 2.1\% |
| Limited liability company | 70.9\% | 16.4\% | 9.1\% | 1.8\% | 1.8\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 69.3\% | 12.0\% | 13.3\% | 4.0\% | 1.3\% |
| Local community | 78.6\% | 10.7\% | 3.6\% | 3.6\% | 3.6\% |
| Public institute | 77.8\% | 11.7\% | 6.1\% | 1.7\% | 2.6\% |
| Total | 71.5\% | 15.0\% | 8.7\% | 2.5\% | 2.2\% |


| Nepotism (the assignment of posts or other favours on the grounds of family ties). | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 41.7\% | 25.0\% | 27.1\% | 4.2\% | 2.1\% |
| Limited liability company | 51.8\% | 32.1\% | 10.7\% | 1.8\% | 3.6\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 69.7\% | 13.2\% | 13.2\% | 3.9\% | 0.0\% |
| Local community | 77.8\% | 11.1\% | 7.4\% | 0.0\% | 3.7\% |
| Public institute | 82.4\% | 9.3\% | 6.2\% | 1.3\% | 0.9\% |
| Total | 71.6\% | 14.6\% | 10.1\% | 2.3\% | 1.4\% |


| Recruitment to these posts is based on the personal selection of the superior to the future middle manager. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 25.0\% | 20.8\% | 33.3\% | 10.4\% | 10.4\% |
| Limited liability company | 22.0\% | 18.0\% | 42.0\% | 18.0\% | 0.0\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 48.1\% | 10.4\% | 28.6\% | 9.1\% | 3.9\% |
| Local community | 51.9\% | 29.6\% | 14.8\% | 0.0\% | 3.7\% |
| Public institute | 65.3\% | 11.1\% | 10.6\% | 8.8\% | 4.2\% |
| Total | 51.5\% | 13.8\% | 20.6\% | 9.8\% | 4.2\% |


| Formal or unwritten criteria are more adjusted to persons without family obligations. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 58.7\% | 21.7\% | 15.2\% | 2.2\% | 2.2\% |
| Limited liability company | 69.2\% | 11.5\% | 11.5\% | 5.8\% | 1.9\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 71.1\% | 18.4\% | 7.9\% | 1.3\% | 1.3\% |
| Local community | 85.7\% | 10.7\% | 3.6\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Public institute | 85.5\% | 5.4\% | 5.0\% | 1.8\% | 2.3\% |
| Total | 78.1\% | 10.6\% | 7.4\% | 2.1\% | 1.8\% |


| Formal or unwritten criteria are more adjusted to men. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 50.0\% | 27.1\% | 16.7\% | 4.2\% | 2.1\% |
| Limited liability company | 70.4\% | 11.1\% | 11.1\% | 7.4\% | 0.0\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 76.6\% | 15.6\% | 3.9\% | 1.3\% | 2.6\% |
| Local community | 85.7\% | 7.1\% | 7.1\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Public institute | 89.2\% | 5.8\% | 2.7\% | 1.8\% | 0.4\% |
| Total | 80.0\% | 10.5\% | 5.9\% | 2.7\% | 0.9\% |


| Formal or unwritten criteria are more adjusted to women. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 52.1\% | 29.2\% | 16.7\% | 0.0\% | 2.1\% |
| Limited liability company | 74.1\% | 18.5\% | 5.6\% | 1.9\% | 0.0\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 76.9\% | 12.8\% | 6.4\% | 2.6\% | 1.3\% |
| Local community | 85.7\% | 10.7\% | 3.6\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Public institute | 89.7\% | 7.6\% | 2.2\% | 0.0\% | 0.4\% |
| Total | 81.0\% | 12.2\% | 5.4\% | 0.7\% | 0.7\% |

### 4.7 Management selection contrary to human resources professional rules

In many places, there were cases of personnel selection not being conducted in accordance with the human resources professional rules. We asked the respondents to ponder the recruitment to the management position (lower, middle or higher) that for them, personally, was the most disputable in the last five years and define the characteristics of this selection. Among the offered possibilities, the respondents most often selected the response that the selection criteria were adjusted to the pre-chosen male candidate (18 \%) - most frequently the respondents from the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts agreed with the said statement (24 \%), followed by the joint-stock companies (22 \%) and limited liability companies (21 \%). The lowest share of those agreeing with such a statement is among the public institutes (14\%). The second response, with which the respondents most often agreed, was that there was a conflict of interests present in the procedure (of management or somebody from the committee) (16\%) - most frequently such a response was marked by the respondents from the state authorities, the offices of the prosecutor and courts (20 \%), followed by the joint-stock companies (18 \%). The lowest share of respondents agreeing is among the local communities (9 \%). The responses that the selection criteria were adjusted to the pre-chosen female candidate and that the documentation pertaining to the recruitment was incomplete/poor were selected as the third most frequent (13 \%). The local communities (17 \%) and state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (14 \%), most frequently, while the joint-stock companies (10 \%) least frequently, agreed with the first statement that the selection criteria were adjusted to the pre-chosen female candidate. They agreed the most often that the documentation was incomplete/poor in the limited liability companies (18 \%) and public institutes (15 \%), while the least often in the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (4 \%). Less agreement was observed for the response that a male was selected instead of a woman, although she was a better candidate (7 \%). Most frequently this was confirmed in the joint-stock companies (10 \%) and limited liability companies (10 \%), and least frequently in the local communities ( $2 \%$ ). The lowest shares of agreement can be found for the response that a woman was selected instead of a man, although he was a better candidate. Most frequently, they agree with the said statement in the public institutes (7\%) and state authorities (6 \%), and least frequently in the joint-stock companies ( $0 \%$ ) and local communities ( $0 \%$ ).

In summary, it can be observed that among practices that were perceived by the respondents as disputable management recruitment in the last five years, plenty of such procedures that more often constitute an obstacle for women than men in reaching management positions were observed - thus, more responses were in favour of men - e.g. by almost 3 percentage points that a man was selected instead of a woman, although she was a better candidate, and by slightly over 5 percentage points that the selection criteria were adjusted to the pre-chosen male candidate. The differences are even higher if we look at them by the type of sector. In the private sector, the selection criteria were adjusted to the pre-chosen male candidate by 12 percentage points more often that for the female candidate; also by 10 percentage points more often was a man selected instead of a woman, although she was a better candidate, than vice versa. In the joint-stock companies, the differences are slightly smaller, but they still exceed the differences in the public sector.

Figure: Estimated characteristics of recruitment to a management position that was, for a respondent, most disputable in the last five years


### 4.8 Recruitment to management positions

From the perspective of transparency, it is important that vacancy notices contain key information. Thus, we were interested in what is contained in those notices (public or internal) for management vacancies (lower, middle or higher management) when they are published by organisations. The reason for a new post was most frequently given in the public institutes (52 \%), and least frequently in the state authorities (35 \%). The description of the primary tasks and responsibilities related to the post was most frequently published in the state authorities ( $90 \%$ ), and least frequently in the public institutes (78 \%). The description of the key competences which are necessary to perform certain work was most frequently published in the joint-stock companies ( $86 \%$ ), and least frequently in the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts ( $62 \%$ ). The description of the expected results was most frequently published in the joint-stock companies ( $28 \%$ ), and least frequently in the public institutes ( $12 \%$ ). The description of the expected status (e.g. without obligations, young and energetic, fresh graduate, etc.) is rarer - most frequent is in the notices for management positions published in the joint-stock companies (10 \%) and least frequent in the public institutes ( $2 \%$ ). The description of the selection procedure implementation (e.g. test, two-stage interview, etc.) is most frequently contained in the notices of the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts ( $44 \%$ ), and least frequently in the limited-liability companies (3 \%).

Figure: What is typically included in vacancy notices for management positions in your organisation?


We also took a closer look at recruitment to all levels of management positions - we were interested to which extent the interviewed persons estimate that the selected staffing procedures apply for their organisation. One of the most important aspects of transparency in staffing is the pre-setting of the "rules of game", namely that the selection criteria are formed before the notice is published and made public, that the evaluation procedure of the female/ male candidates is the same for all, that the committees are composed in such a way that the profession has a say, that the selection procedure is recorded, that transparent procedures for resolving appeals exist and that the potential candidates from the organisation do not have more information available than those from the outside, etc.

Firstly, let us take a look at the set of responses relating to the actual publication of the notice and the preparation of the requirements for filling the vacancy. From the responses, it is evident that, on average, $15 \%$ of the participating organisations (almost) never have the selection criteria formed before the notice is published, $10 \%$ of them are not made public, and in $33 \%$ of organisations no one explains them to the potential applicants. Regarding the notices, the respondents responded that, on average, recruitment to $7 \%$ of cases for certain management posts is (almost) always performed by not publishing notices, but sending invitations to specific candidates instead, that in $70 \%$ of cases the vacancy notice for a post is (almost) always published, although the candidate has already been selected, and that in $7 \%$ of cases the requirements for filling a certain management post are (almost) always adjusted to the pre-selected candidate.

Considering the type of organisation, differences exist - thus, the limited liability companies ( $18 \%$ ) most frequently selected the response that the selection criteria are (almost) never formed before the notice is published, while such a response was least frequently chosen by the joint-stock companies ( $9 \%$ ). The highest share of those, where this is (almost) always the case, was among the local communities (81 \%), and the lowest among the limited liability companies (74 \%). The local communities are the ones most frequently responding that the selection criteria are (almost) never made public ( $21 \%$ ), while the lowest share of such can be found among the public institutes ( $6 \%$ ). On the other hand, there are those where
such a practice (almost) always takes place - the most among the public institutes (87 \%) and the least among the limited liability companies ( $66 \%$ ). Explanation of the criteria to the potential applicants is a rarer practice - this is (almost) never the case in one third (33 \%) of the organisations and (almost) always in slightly less than half of them (46 \%). Considering the organisational form, the shares of those where this is almost (never) the case, are quite similar - the most of them are among the limited liability companies (36 \%) and the least among the local communities (32 \%) and public institutes (32 \%). Among those where this is (almost) always the case, the differences are slightly higher - the most of them are among the local communities (55 \%) and the least among the limited liability companies (43 \%). That for certain posts, notices are not published, but invitations to specific candidates are sent instead, is not a common practice in general - $85 \%$ of the respondents responded that this is (almost) never the case in their organisation. However, on the other hand, there are $7 \%$ of the organisations where this is (almost) always the case. The most of them are among the jointstock companies (15 \%) and the least among the state authorities, including the courts and the offices of the prosecutor (4 \%). The most of those, where this in (almost) never the case, are among the local communities (94 \%) and the least among the joint-stock companies (61 $\%)$. The practice that the organisations publish a notice for a post, although candidate has already been selected is more common - that this is (almost) always the case was confirmed by $70 \%$ of the participants. The local communities agreed the most often ( $85 \%$ ) and the limited liability companies the least often (38\%). In total, $20 \%$ of the participants said that this is almost (never) the case in their organisation - the highest share of such participants was among the limited liability companies (48 \%) and the lowest among the local communities (11 \%). Adjustment of the requirements for filling a vacancy to a pre-chosen candidate is, on average, (almost) always applied practice in $7 \%$ of the participating organisations; the local communities (13 \%) agreed the most frequently and the joint-stock companies (2 \%) the least frequently. The highest share of those where this is (almost) never the case, is in the public institutes (88\%) and the lowest in the joint-stock companies (83 \%).

Tables: How often this is the case in your organisation in the event of the management recruitment (lower, middle, higher)

| Selection criteria are formed before a notice is published. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 8.5\% | 0.0\% | 14.9\% | 34.0\% | 42.6\% |
| Limited liability company | 13.1\% | 4.9\% | 8.2\% | 31.1\% | 42.6\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 10.8\% | 2.7\% | 6.8\% | 17.6\% | 62.2\% |
| Local community | 8.3\% | 4.2\% | 6.3\% | 16.7\% | 64.6\% |
| Public institute | 14.2\% | 2.1\% | 6.7\% | 10.4\% | 66.7\% |
| Total | 12.2\% | 2.7\% | 7.9\% | 17.4\% | 59.9\% |


| Selection criteria are made public. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 6.5\% | 4.3\% | 13.0\% | 37.0\% | 39.1\% |
| Limited liability company | 3.4\% | 6.8\% | 23.7\% | 30.5\% | 35.6\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 6.9\% | 11.1\% | 11.1\% | 11.1\% | 59.7\% |
| Local community | 14.6\% | 6.3\% | 4.2\% | 14.6\% | 60.4\% |
| Public institute | 3.8\% | 1.7\% | 7.2\% | 9.4\% | 77.9\% |
| Total | 5.7\% | 4.7\% | 10.1\% | 15.6\% | 63.8\% |
| Selection criteria are explained to the potential applicants. |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| Joint-stock company | 13.0\% | 19.6\% | 15.2\% | 30.4\% | 21.7\% |
| Limited liability company | 19.0\% | 17.2\% | 20.7\% | 20.7\% | 22.4\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 21.4\% | 14.3\% | 17.1\% | 12.9\% | 34.3\% |
| Local community | 27.7\% | 4.3\% | 12.8\% | 19.1\% | 36.2\% |
| Public institute | 22.7\% | 9.2\% | 24.0\% | 14.4\% | 29.7\% |
| Total | 21.8\% | 11.4\% | 20.5\% | 17.1\% | 29,2\% |
| For certain posts, notices are not published, but invitations to specific candidates are sent instead. |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| Joint-stock company | 39.1\% | 21.7\% | 23.9\% | 10.9\% | 4.3\% |
| Limited liability company | 50.0\% | 19.6\% | 21.4\% | 7.1\% | 1.8\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 84.6\% | 6.4\% | 5.1\% | 2.6\% | 1.3\% |
| Local community | 76.6\% | 17.0\% | 0.0\% | 2.1\% | 4.3\% |
| Public institute | 83.6\% | 6.6\% | 4.4\% | 2.2\% | 3.1\% |
| Total | 74.0\% | 10.8\% | 8.4\% | 3.9\% | 3.0\% |
| A vacancy notice is made public, although a candidate has already been chosen. |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| Joint-stock company | 20.0\% | 8.9\% | 26.7\% | 15.6\% | 28.9\% |
| Limited liability company | 32.8\% | 15.5\% | 13.8\% | 12.1\% | 25.9\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 11.4\% | 5.7\% | 8.6\% | 12.9\% | 61.4\% |
| Local community | 6.5\% | 4.3\% | 4.3\% | 15.2\% | 69.6\% |
| Public institute | 11.3\% | 2.3\% | 8.1\% | 9.0\% | 69.4\% |
| Total | 14.8\% | 5.3\% | 10.6\% | 11.3\% | 58.1\% |


| In our organisation, the requirements for filling a vacancy are adjusted to a pre-selected candidate. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 58.7\% | 23.9\% | 15.2\% | 2.2\% | 0.0\% |
| Limited liability company | 71.2\% | 11.9\% | 10.2\% | 6.8\% | 0.0\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 76.3\% | 6.6\% | 9.2\% | 7.9\% | 0.0\% |
| Local community | 74.5\% | 8.5\% | 4.3\% | 4.3\% | 8.5\% |
| Public institute | 82.1\% | 5.4\% | 5.8\% | 3.6\% | 3.1\% |
| Total | 76.1\% | 8.8\% | 8.0\% | 4.5\% | 2.6\% |

The second set of actions pertaining to recruitment to management positions is defined by the selection procedure. We were also interested in whether the latter is fair and objective, whether the questions and the time to respond are the same for all, whether the responses are recorded and who has access to the information and questions for the candidates. That the evaluation procedure is (almost) always fair and objective was estimated by $86 \%$ of the participants, and that it is almost (never) such was considered by $3 \%$ of the participants. The highest share of those who estimate such procedures as (almost) always fair and objective is among the local communities ( $92 \%$ ), followed by the public institutes ( $90 \%$ ). The most of those who believe that these procedures are (almost) never such ( $5 \%$ ) are among the state authorities. Written tests that measure capabilities for filling a certain vacancy are not a common way of estimating the candidates - one half ( $50 \%$ ) of the participants responded that in their management selection procedures, they are almost (never) used, while $21 \%$ of the participants believe that they are (almost) always used. The most of those that (almost) never apply them are among the public institutes (68 \%), followed by the limited liability companies ( $50 \%$ ); the most of those that (almost) always apply them are among the local communities ( $35 \%$ ), while the least are among the public institutes (12 \%). According to the participants' estimates, (almost) never are the same, pre-determined questions given to each candidate in $12 \%$ of the organisations, while (almost) always in $71 \%$ of them. The highest share of those who most frequently selected the response that the questions are the same and predetermined for everybody is among the local communities (96 \%), and the lowest among the limited liability companies (56 \%). The most of those, where this is (almost) never the case, are among the limited liability companies and the least among the local communities (2 \%). That each candidate (almost) always has the same amount of time available to respond to the questions was estimated by $82 \%$ of the participants, while $6 \%$ of them agree that this is (almost) never the case. The most of those who believe that this is (almost) always the case are among the local communities ( $96 \%$ ); the least of them are among the limited liability companies (70 \%). Among them, there is also the most ( $15 \%$ ) of those who estimate that this was (almost) never the case in their organisation. The least of those are among the local communities - not a single participating person from the local communities has chosen these two options. That each response is (almost) always written down by all members of the committee was estimated by $37 \%$ of all participants; almost as many estimate that this is (almost) never the case ( $32 \%$ ). The most of those who believe that this is (almost) always the case are among the local communities ( $53 \%$ ), and the least among the limited liability companies ( $24 \%$ ). The most of those who estimate that this is (almost) never the case are among the joint-stock companies (43 \%), and the least among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (19 \%). That (almost) always all responses are recorded in a joint document (are not recorded by each member of the committee separately) was estimated by $46 \%$ of the
participants, and that this is (almost) never the case by $32 \%$ of them. In terms of the latter, the highest share is among the limited liability companies (52 \%), and the lowest among the local communities ( $16 \%$ ). Precisely the opposite applies for those who estimate that this is (almost) never the case in their organisation - the highest share is among the local communities (68 $\%)$, and the lowest among the limited liability companies (27 \%). Only the persons involved in the selection procedure are familiar with the questions relating to the possible written test and interview until they are conducted - that, in their organisation, this is (almost) always the case was estimated by $73 \%$ of participants and that this is (almost) never the case by 17 $\%$ of them. The highest share of those estimating that, in their organisation, this is (almost) always the case is among the local communities (84 \%), and the lowest among the public institutes (60 \%). The most frequent response was that, in their organisation, this is (almost) never the case selected among the public institutes (28 \%), and the least frequent among the joint-stock companies (3 \%). The last statement within this set was examining to which extent the participating persons believe that the statement when the notice is public, the potential internal candidates do not have access to more information than those from the outside applies for their organisation. That such a statement (almost) always applies was estimated by $65 \%$ of the participants, and that it (almost) never applies by $22 \%$ of them. In terms of the latter, the highest share is among the limited liability companies (34 \%), and the lowest among the local communities (14\%). It is precisely the opposite among those who estimate that the statement (almost) always applies - most of them are among the local communities (84 \%), and the least among the limited liability companies (50 \%).

Tables: How often this is the case in your organisation in the event of the management recruitment (lower, middle, higher)

| The evaluation procedure of candidates is fair and objective. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 23.9\% | 37.0\% | 39.1\% |
| Limited liability company | 1.7\% | 1.7\% | 15.3\% | 54.2\% | 27.1\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 2.7\% | 2.7\% | 12.2\% | 20.3\% | 62.2\% |
| Local community | 2.0\% | 0.0\% | 6.1\% | 30.6\% | 61.2\% |
| Public institute | 1.3\% | 2.2\% | 7.0\% | 18.7\% | 70.9\% |
| Total | 1.5\% | 1.7\% | 10.6\% | 26.9\% | 59,3\% |


| The evaluation procedure of <br> candidates includes written tests <br> that measure capabilities for filling a <br> certain vacancy. |
| :--- |
| Never |


| Each candidate is asked the same, pre-determined questions. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 4.5\% | 9.1\% | 18.2\% | 52.3\% | 15.9\% |
| Limited liability company | 3.6\% | 10.9\% | 29.1\% | 34.5\% | 21.8\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 2.7\% | 6.8\% | 9.6\% | 20.5\% | 60.3\% |
| Local community | 2.2\% | .0\% | 2.2\% | 20.0\% | 75.6\% |
| Public institute | 7.7\% | 6.3\% | 19.3\% | 34.3\% | 32.4\% |
| Total | 5.3\% | 6.4\% | 17.0\% | 32.2\% | 39.1\% |


| Each candidate has the same amount of time available to respond to questions. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 2.3\% | 2.3\% | 14.0\% | 39.5\% | 41.9\% |
| Limited liability company | 1.9\% | 13.0\% | 14.8\% | 24.1\% | 46.3\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 2.8\% | 1.4\% | 11.1\% | 18.1\% | 66.7\% |
| Local community | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 4.3\% | 27.7\% | 68.1\% |
| Public institute | 3.4\% | 2.9\% | 12.2\% | 29.8\% | 51.7\% |
| Total | 2.5\% | 3.5\% | 11.8\% | 27.7\% | 54.5\% |


| Each response is written down by all members of the committee. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 13,5\% | 29,7\% | 32,4\% | 18,9\% | 5,4\% |
| Limited liability company | 16,7\% | 24,1\% | 35,2\% | 18,5\% | 5,6\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 8,8\% | 10,3\% | 32,4\% | 13,2\% | 35,3\% |
| Local community | 15,6\% | 8,9\% | 22,2\% | 13,3\% | 40,0\% |
| Public institute | 20,7\% | 14,5\% | 31,3\% | 16,2\% | 17,3\% |
| Total | 16,5\% | 15,5\% | 31,5\% | 16,0\% | 20,6\% |


| All responses are recorded in a joint document (are not recorded by each member of the committee separately). | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 18.9\% | 18.9\% | 32.4\% | 18.9\% | 10.8\% |
| Limited liability company | 26.9\% | 25.0\% | 21.2\% | 17.3\% | 9.6\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 12.9\% | 5.7\% | 21.4\% | 12.9\% | 47.1\% |
| Local community | 9.1\% | 6.8\% | 15.9\% | 9.1\% | 59.1\% |
| Public institute | 24.6\% | 10.1\% | 21.2\% | 20.1\% | 24.0\% |
| Total | 20.4\% | 11.5\% | 21.9\% | 16.8\% | 29.5\% |

Only the persons involved in the selection procedure are familiar with the questions relating to the possible written test and interview until they are conducted.
$\left.\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c}\text { Never } \begin{array}{c}\text { Almost } \\ \text { never }\end{array} & \text { Occasionally } & \\ \text { Almost } \\ \text { always }\end{array}\right)$ Always

| When the notice is public, the potential internal candidates do not have access to more information than is available to the candidates from the outside. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 15.8\% | 2.6\% | 21.1\% | 26.3\% | 34.2\% |
| Limited liability company | 20.0\% | 14.0\% | 16.0\% | 16.0\% | 34.0\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 13.7\% | 2.7\% | 8.2\% | 20.5\% | 54.8\% |
| Local community | 6.8\% | 6.8\% | 2.3\% | 15.9\% | 68.2\% |
| Public institute | 18.5\% | 4.5\% | 16.0\% | 11.0\% | 50.0\% |
| Total | 16.3\% | 5.3\% | 13.7\% | 15.1\% | 49.5\% |

The third set of questions about the management personnel selection refers to the committees - that the members of the committee are (almost) always selected subject to the understanding of the field of work in which the person shall be employed, is believed by $77 \%$ of the participants - the highest share of the agreeing participants is among the joint-stock companies (86 \%), and the lowest among the public institutes (73 \%). That this is (almost) never the case was estimated by $10 \%$ of the participants - the most among the limited liability companies (13 \%) and the least among the local communities (4 \%). (Almost) always at least one member of the committee is selected in order to provide the "outside view" - the share of those agreeing ( $36 \%$ ) is approximately the same as of those believing that this is (almost) never the case (39 \%) in their organisation. The state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, are those among which most believe that this is (almost) always the case (59 \%) and least estimate that this is almost (never) the case (25 \%) in their organisation. The lowest share of those estimating that this is (almost) always the case in their organisation is among the limited liability companies (19 \%); the most of those who believe that this is (almost) never the case in their organisation are among the limited liability companies (59 \%). The same members of the committee being present at each individual interview for the same post is a prerequisite for the fair treatment of the candidates. Despite that, almost one quarter ( $23 \%$ ) of the participants estimate that this is (almost) never the case in their organisation - the most of them are among the limited liability companies (32 \%), and the least among the local communities (15 \%). That such a composition of the committees is
(almost) always assured is estimated by $59 \%$ of the participants - the most of them are among the local communities (75 \%), and the least among the limited liability companies (52 \%). In case a member of the committee establishes the actual or possible conflict of interests, she/he shall be eliminated from the procedure - that this is almost (always) the case in their organisation was estimated by $59 \%$ of the participants; the most of them are among the local communities (82 \%), and the least among the joint-stock companies (36 \%). That this is (almost) always the case is believed by $25 \%$ of the participants - most of them are among the limited liability companies (42 \%), and the least among the local communities (14 \%). It is important that the committee can conduct their work in a manner in which its members are not exposed to any pressures, suggestions or other influences of the management pertaining to the course of the selection and/or procedure. That the committees are (almost) never exposed to these pressures in their organisation was estimated by $73 \%$ of the participants, while $9 \%$ of them believe that they (almost) always are exposed to them. The highest share of those believing that this is (almost) never the case is among the public institutes (12 \%), and none among the joint-stock companies. Where there was estimated that this is (almost) never the case, the highest share of participants selecting such a response was among the limited liability companies (82 \%), and the lowest among the joint-stock companies (66\%).

Tables: How often this is the case in your organisation in the event of the management recruitment (lower, middle, higher)

| Members of the committee are selected subject to their understanding of the field in which the person shall be employed. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 0.0\% | 4.7\% | 9.3\% | 34.9\% | 51.2\% |
| Limited liability company | 10.9\% | 1.8\% | 9.1\% | 43.6\% | 34.5\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 2.7\% | 5.4\% | 12.2\% | 20.3\% | 59.5\% |
| Local community | 2.1\% | 2.1\% | 10.4\% | 35.4\% | 50.0\% |
| Public institute | 7.6\% | 4.7\% | 15.2\% | 26.1\% | 46.4\% |
| Total | 5.6\% | 4.3\% | 12.6\% | 29.3\% | 48.1\% |


| At least one of the members of the committee is selected in order to provide an "outside view". | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 16.3\% | 27.9\% | 37.2\% | 11.6\% | 7.0\% |
| Limited liability company | 33.9\% | 25.0\% | 21.4\% | 14.3\% | 5.4\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 14.7\% | 10.7\% | 16.0\% | 17.3\% | 41.3\% |
| Local community | 21.7\% | 8.7\% | 34.8\% | 19.6\% | 15.2\% |
| Public institute | 27.0\% | 13.5\% | 22.5\% | 14.0\% | 23.0\% |
| Total | 23.7\% | 15.5\% | 24.8\% | 14.8\% | 21.1\% |


| The same members of the committee are present at each individual interview for the same post. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 4.7\% | 16.3\% | 23.3\% | 32.6\% | 23.3\% |
| Limited liability company | 17.9\% | 14.3\% | 16.1\% | 32.1\% | 19.6\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 12.0\% | 12.0\% | 24.0\% | 8.0\% | 44.0\% |
| Local community | 4.3\% | 10.6\% | 10.6\% | 23.4\% | 51.1\% |
| Public institute | 13.2\% | 10.3\% | 16.7\% | 21.1\% | 38.7\% |
| Total | 11.7\% | 11.5\% | 17.9\% | 21.8\% | 37.2\% |

In case a member of the committee establishes an actual or possible conflict of interests, she/he shall be eliminated from the procedure.

| Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 11.1\% | 30.6\% | 22.2\% | 16.7\% | 19.4\% |
| 25.6\% | 16.3\% | 20.9\% | 27.9\% | 9.3\% |
| 13.0\% | 8.7\% | 14.5\% | 5.8\% | 58.0\% |
| 13.6\% | 0.0\% | 4.5\% | 15.9\% | 65.9\% |
| 14.9\% | 7.7\% | 15.5\% | 14.9\% | 47.0\% |
| 14.8\% | 10.4\% | 15.6\% | 15.4\% | 43.8\% |

Members of the committee are exposed to pressures, suggestions or other influences of the management pertaining to the course of the selection and/or procedure.


| Joint-stock company | 31.8\% | 34.1\% | 27.3\% | 6.8\% | 0.0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Limited liability company | 53.7\% | 27.8\% | 18.5\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 43.8\% | 26.0\% | 23.3\% | 5.5\% | 1.4\% |
| Local community | 50.0\% | 23.9\% | 17.4\% | 4.3\% | 4.3\% |
| Public institute | 56.3\% | 17.1\% | 14.6\% | 6.5\% | 5.5\% |
| Total | 50.5\% | 22.9\% | 18.0\% | 5.4\% | 3.3\% |

The last set of statements referred to the actual selection. The first statement within this set was that there exists a written document with an explanation as to why somebody was selected and other women/men were not and who was responsible for the final decision. That such a document (almost) never exists in their organisation was responded by 27 \% of the participants - the most among the limited liability companies (49 \%) and the least among the state authorities, including the courts and the offices of the prosecutor.

That such a document (almost) always exists was estimated by $55 \%$ of the participants - the highest share was among the local communities (89 \%) and the lowest among the limited liability companies (28 \%). The educational references of the candidates are (almost) never verified by $14 \%$ of the participating organisations - the highest share of such organisations is among the joint-stock companies (33 \%) and the lowest among the local communities (4 \%). They are (almost) always verified by $68 \%$ of the participating organisations - most frequently in the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (84 \%), and least frequently in the limited liability companies (47 \%). Almost (never) are the professional references of the candidate verified in $12 \%$ of the participating organisations, while they are almost always verified in $58 \%$ of them. The limited liability companies most frequently selected the response that this is (almost) never done in their organisation (26 \%), and least frequently the response that they (almost) always do (46 \%). The opposite applies for the local communities - the least frequent response was (almost) never ( $2 \%$ ) and the most frequent (almost) always (66\%). Next, we were interested in how often it is the case in the organisations that if the candidate is not satisfied with the selection, there is a transparent appeal procedure available. That such a procedure is (almost) always available was responded by $88 \%$ of the participants - such a response was selected in the highest share by the local communities (98 \%) and in the lowest by the limited liability companies (59 \%). That such a procedure is (almost) never available was responded by $6 \%$ of the participants - the most are among the limited liability companies (22 \%) and the least among the local communities, where such a response was not even selected once. When the pre-chosen candidate has outstandingly good competences, the notice is (almost) always published in $11 \%$ of the participating organisations - most frequently this is the case among the joint-stock companies (27 \%), and least frequently among the public institutes (2 \%). In such cases, it is (almost) never published in $76 \%$ of the participating organisations - most frequently, such a response was selected in the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (87\%), and least frequently in the limited liability companies (40 \%). That their selection procedures are (almost) always such that they do not include any gender discrimination is believed by $86 \%$ of the respondents - most frequently, such a response was selected in the local communities (89 \%) and least frequently in the limited liability companies (77 \%). That this is (almost) never the case was estimated by $9 \%$ of the respondents - the highest share of those selecting such a response is among the limited liability companies (16 \%), and the lowest among the joint-stock companies (4 \%). The last statement within this set referred to the role of the personnel service in promotion - that the personnel service is (almost) always involved in the decision-making on the promotion of the employees (deciding and not just drawing-up the decision), was confirmed by $39 \%$ of the participants, almost as many as those who said that this is (almost) never the case ( $37 \%$ ). Such a response was most frequently selected by the respondents from the public institutes ( $43 \%$ ) and least frequently from the limited liability companies (20 \%). Where this is (almost) always the case, the most frequent such response was selected in the local communities (44 \%) and the least frequent in the limited liability companies (37 \%).

Tables: How often this is the case in your organisation in the event of management recruitment (lower, middle, higher)

| A written document with an explanation, as to why somebody was selected and others were not and who was responsible for the final decision, exists. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 27.5\% | 15.0\% | 25.0\% | 22.5\% | 10.0\% |
| Limited liability company | 21.1\% | 28.1\% | 22.8\% | 17.5\% | 10.5\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 2.8\% | 1.4\% | 11.3\% | 14.1\% | 70.4\% |
| Local community | 2.1\% | 2.1\% | 6.4\% | 21.3\% | 68.1\% |
| Public institute | 16.8\% | 13.9\% | 19.7\% | 10.6\% | 38.9\% |
| Total | 14.1\% | 12.9\% | 17.6\% | 14.3\% | 41.1\% |


| Educational references of the candidates are verified. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 2.2\% | 8.7\% | 30.4\% | 26.1\% | 32.6\% |
| Limited liability company | 10.5\% | 22.8\% | 19.3\% | 29.8\% | 17.5\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 2.7\% | 4.1\% | 9.5\% | 16.2\% | 67.6\% |
| Local community | 2.1\% | 2.1\% | 20.8\% | 22.9\% | 52.1\% |
| Public institute | 6.3\% | 7.6\% | 17.4\% | 15.6\% | 53.1\% |
| Total | 5.2\% | 8.9\% | 18.0\% | 19.5\% | 48.4\% |

Professional references of the candidates are verified.

| Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2,1\% | 6,4\% | 40,4\% | 34,0\% | 17,0\% |
| 12.3\% | 14.0\% | 28.1\% | 33.3\% | 12.3\% |
| 5.3\% | 4.0\% | 36.0\% | 20.0\% | 34.7\% |
| 2.1\% | 0.0\% | 31.9\% | 25.5\% | 40.4\% |
| 5.9\% | 6.8\% | 25.2\% | 14.0\% | 48.2\% |
| 5.7\% | 6.7\% | 29.8\% | 20.4\% | 37.4\% |


| If the candidate is not satisfied with the selection, there is a transparent appeal procedure available. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 7.0\% | .0\% | 14.0\% | 23.3\% | 55.8\% |
| Limited liability company | 7.8\% | 13.7\% | 19.6\% | 21.6\% | 37.3\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 2.7\% | 1.4\% | 5.4\% | 13.5\% | 77.0\% |
| Local community | .0\% | 0.0\% | 2.1\% | 14.6\% | 83.3\% |
| Public institute | 2.7\% | 0.9\% | 2.7\% | 9.5\% | 84.2\% |
| Total | 3.3\% | 2.4\% | 6.2\% | 13.6\% | 74.4\% |


| When the pre-selected candidate has outstandingly good competences, the notice is not published. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 27.3\% | 22.7\% | 22.7\% | 18.2\% | 9.1\% |
| Limited liability company | 23.6\% | 16.4\% | 34.5\% | 14.5\% | 10.9\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 76.0\% | 10.7\% | 5.3\% | 6.7\% | 1.3\% |
| Local community | 67.4\% | 15.2\% | 4.3\% | 6.5\% | 6.5\% |
| Public institute | 80.0\% | 6.5\% | 8.8\% | 2.8\% | 1.9\% |
| Total | 65.1\% | 11.2\% | 12.5\% | 6.9\% | 4.3\% |


| Our selection procedures are such that they do not include any gender discrimination. | Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Joint-stock company | 4.4\% | 0.0\% | 8.9\% | 13.3\% | 73.3\% |
| Limited liability company | 8.9\% | 7.1\% | 7.1\% | 21.4\% | 55.4\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 6.9\% | 2.8\% | 5.6\% | 6.9\% | 77.8\% |
| Local community | 4.3\% | 2.1\% | 4.3\% | 6.4\% | 83.0\% |
| Public institute | 7.2\% | 1.8\% | 4.5\% | 4.1\% | 82.4\% |
| Total | 6.6\% | 2.4\% | 5.3\% | 8.0\% | 77.7\% |

The personnel service is involved in the decision-making on the promotion of the employees.

| Never | Almost never | Occasionally | Almost always | Always |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 4.4\% | 15.6\% | 37.8\% | 22.2\% | 20.0\% |
| 24.6\% | 17.5\% | 21.1\% | 24.6\% | 12.3\% |
| 32.4\% | 8.5\% | 18.3\% | 12.7\% | 28.2\% |
| 23.9\% | 4.3\% | 28.3\% | 10.9\% | 32.6\% |
| 31.5\% | 11.5\% | 22.0\% | 12.5\% | 22.5\% |
| 26.2\% | 11.1\% | 23.9\% | 15.3\% | 23.4\% |

### 4.9 Decision-making on the selection and the role of the selection committees

For all three levels of management, we were interested in who usually makes the final decision on who shall be appointed to the position. The lower management in the joint-stock companies is most frequently selected by a direct superior on his or her own, usually on the basis of clear, pre-determined criteria with which all employed persons are familiar (24 \%), and by a direct superior on his or her own, usually on the basis of the observations/work estimate and capabilities of the selected person ( $24 \%$ ); the same applies for the limited liability companies ( $32 \%$ ). For the state authorities, including the courts and offices of the prosecutor, and public institutes, the most frequent selection method of lower management is such that it is selected by a direct superior on his or her own, usually on the basis of clear, pre-determined criteria with which all employed persons are familiar (state authorities, including the courts and offices of the prosecutor - 19 \%; public institutes - $14 \%$ ). In the local communities, the most frequent selection method of this level of management is such that it is selected by a special committee selecting among candidates that expresses their interest in being promoted in annual interviews. In the joint-stock companies, the middle management is most frequently selected by a direct superior on his or her own, usually on the basis of the observations/work estimate and capabilities of the selected person (26 \%), in the limited liability companies by the owner of the company ( $29 \%$ ), and in the state authorities, including the courts and offices of the prosecutor (22 \%), and public institutes (15 \%) by the direct superior on his or her own, usually on the basis of clear, pre-determined criteria with which all employed persons are familiar. In the local communities, the most frequent selection method of the middle management is such that it is selected by a special committee selecting among the candidates that express their interest in being promoted in annual interviews. The final selection method for the top management is more diversified - in the joint-stock companies (40 \%) and the public institutes ( $48 \%$ ) it is most frequently selected by the supervisory authority (supervisory board, council of an institute, etc.), in the limited liability companies by the owner of the company ( $65 \%$ ), in the local communities by the voters ( $39 \%$ ), while in the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, the most frequently selected option was "somebody else" (24 \%), followed by option "politics" (23 \%).


| Joint-stock company | 6.0\% | 2.0\% | 24.0\% | 24.0\% | 14.0\% | 0.0\% | 2.0\% | 2.0\% | 22.0\% | 4.0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Limited liability company | 14.3\% | 0.0\% | 31.7\% | 15.9\% | 6.3\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 15.9\% | 12.7\% | 3,2\% |
| State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 31.4\% | 0.0\% | 10.5\% | 18.6\% | 16.3\% | 3.5\% | 0.0\% | 1.2\% | 9.3\% | 9.3\% |
| Local community | 48.1\% | 1.9\% | 9.3\% | 11.1\% | 16.7\% | 1.9\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 1.9\% | 9.3\% |
| Public institute | 46.5\% | 1.5\% | 10.0\% | 14.4\% | 4.1\% | 1.5\% | 6.3\% | 1.1\% | 9.6\% | 5.2\% |


| Joint-stock company | 6.0\% | 2.0\% | 26.0\% | 24.0\% | 10.0\% | 0.0\% | 2.0\% | 10.0\% | 14.0\% | 6.0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Limited liability company | 4.8\% | 0.0\% | 19.0\% | 20.6\% | 3.2\% | 0.0\% | 3.2\% | 28.6\% | 17.5\% | 3.2\% |

State authority, $\begin{array}{lllllllllll}\text { office of the } & 11.6 \% & 0.0 \% & 12.8 \% & 22.1 \% & 17.4 \% & 8.1 \% & 1.2 \% & 1.2 \% & 14.0 \% & 11.6 \%\end{array}$ prosecutor, court

| Local community | 20 | 0.0\% | 9 | 22 | 25 | 5.6\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | \% | 5.6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Public institute | 33.9\% | 1.1\% | 10.7\% | 15.1\% | 5.5\% | 1.5\% | 12.5\% | 1.1\% | 12.9\% | 5.5\% |


|  | Joint-stock company | 4.0\% | 0.0\% | 16.0\% | 2.0\% | 4.0\% | 4.0\% | 40.0\% | 24.0\% | 4.0\% | 2.0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Limited liability company | 6.3\% | 0.0\% | 1.6\% | 9.5\% | 1.6\% | 0.0\% | 9.5\% | 65.1\% | 3.2\% | 3.2\% |
|  | State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | 16.3\% | 3.5\% | 3.5\% | 3.5\% | 11.6\% | 23.3\% | 5.8\% | 1.2\% | 7.0\% | 24.4\% |
|  | Local community | 14.8\% | 38.9\% | 14.8\% | 3.7\% | 13.0\% | 5.6\% | 0.0\% | 1.9\% | 5.6\% | 1.9\% |
|  | Public institute | 17.3\% | 3.0\% | 7.0\% | 5.5\% | 3.7\% | 1.8\% | 47.6\% | 3.0\% | 6.6\% | 4.4\% |

Regarding committees, we were interested in how they are composed and how much attention is given by the organisations to the gender composition of the committees that conduct interviews by the candidates for management positions, whereby multiple responses could be chosen, since organisations usually do not have the same procedures for all levels of management. Regardless of the organisational form, concern for the committees being composed of both genders is not often present - only in $9 \%$ of the participating organisations, on average. Such a response was most frequently selected by the local communities (20 \%) and least frequently by the joint-stock companies (4 \%). Consequently, a significantly higher share of selected responses was for the possibility that when composing the committees, the gender of the members is not observed by the organisations - in total, in was selected by slightly over half of the participants ( $52 \%$ ). It was most frequently selected by the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (70 \%) and least frequently by the public institutes ( $44 \%$ ). Often, the organisations do not have committees for management positions ( $37 \%$ ). - most frequently such a response was selected by the limited liability companies (43 \%) and least frequently by the local communities (19 \%).

Figure: How are committees that conduct interviews with candidates for management positions typically composed?


Awareness of the members of committees for the selection of managers of gender equality is poor - that all members of these committees are always aware was, on average, agreed by $0.6 \%$ of those whose organisations have such committees. In the joint-stock and limited liability companies, nobody agreed; in the public institutes, state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, and local communities, one participating person agreed. In total, three persons in three organisations. Also, the application of measures to minimise the risk of bias of the members of committees conducting interviews with candidates for management positions is not a common practice - in total, it was introduced in $7 \%$ of the participating organisations. It is most frequent in the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts ( $12 \%$ ) and least frequent in the joint-stock companies, where such responses were not selected by a single participant. Fifteen organisations also defined what these measures are, as follows: internal guidelines, elimination of persons having family, friendly or collegial ties with a candidate, public presentation of all candidates to the bodies of the institute, training of and supervision over the committees, the same questions for all candidates and pre-determined estimation criteria.

Figure: Are any measures applied in your organisation to minimise the risk of bias of the members of committees conducting interviews with candidates for management positions?


### 4.10 Characteristics of the last employment of management

We also took a closer look at the last employment of management in the participating organisations, whereby it was not important whether this was a new employment or a career rise of somebody from the organisation and neither when this employment took place. In slightly more than half of the cases, this was a higher management employment (53 \%), followed by middle management (32 \%), while the fewest employments were of lower management (14 \%) ${ }^{5}$. Although in the large majority of the organisations, the criteria for filling a management vacancy is published in advance (to a lesser extent, they were submitted to all who had requested them), there is a 24 (middle management), 15 (higher management) and 11 percent (lower management) gap of the organisations that have neither published nor submitted the criteria to those interested if they requested them. A closer look shows that in practice, the biggest difference between the private and public sectors appears with regard to the top management - in total, less than half (45 \%) of the joint-stock companies and limited liability companies have previously published the criteria for filling a vacancy, while this share is significantly higher in the public sector ( 91 \%). An estimate in writing of the candidates pursuant to the pre-determined criteria is not a common practice - it was most frequently applied in the last employments of the lower management (26 \%), and almost as frequently of the higher management ( $24 \%$ ), while the least frequently was of the middle management (19 \%). Regardless of the management level, it is less often applied by the private sector than the public sector - with regard to the lower management, in $20 \%$ of cases in the private sector and in $28 \%$ in the public sector and, with regard to the higher management, in $18 \%$ of the cases of the private sector and in $26 \%$ of the public sector. We were also interested in how often procedures were conducted by the committees - with regard to the lower (43 \%) and middle management (48 \%), this was the case in slightly less than half of the cases; slightly more often this was the case with regard to the higher management ( $58 \%$ ). Again, there are differences between the private and public sectors - in the selection of the lower management, they occurred in $30 \%$ of cases in the private sector and in $49 \%$ of the cases in the public sector; in the selection of the middle management, they occurred in $36 \%$ of the cases in the

[^5]private sector, and in $55 \%$ of cases in the public sector. Gender diversity of the committees is not a common practice - it is least frequent in employment of the middle management (22 \%), followed by the lower management (26 \%), and most frequent in terms of the higher management (37\%). In terms of the lower management, it is more frequent in the private sector ( $25 \%$ ) than in the public sector ( $21 \%$ ); the same applies for the middle management (private sector $24 \%$ and public sector $20 \%$ ); however, it is precisely the opposite in terms of the higher management - private sector $16 \%$ and public sector $42 \%$. Documenting of the entire selection procedure for the last employment of management took place in $49 \%$ of the cases of the lower and middle management and in $72 \%$ of cases of the higher management. For all levels of management, the entire selection procedure was less frequently documented by the private sector than the public one - lower management: private sector 35 \%, public sector 56 \%; middle management: private sector $38 \%$, public sector 56 \%; higher management: private sector $34 \%$, public sector $81 \%$. We were also interested in whether the respondents believe that the selection criteria were adjusted to a pre-selected candidate. This is not a common practice - in terms of the lower management, it was perceived by 3.3 $\%$ of the participants for each gender; in terms of the middle management, by $1.5 \%$ for each gender and in terms of the higher management, by $3.6 \%$ in favour of the men and $0.9 \%$ in favour of the women. In terms of the lower and middle management, such a practice in favour of men was perceived by two organisations of the public sector, and in terms of the higher management, by one organisation of the private and seven organisations of the public sector. In favour of women, it was perceived by two organisations of the public sector in terms of the lower and middle management, and by one organisation of the private sector in terms of the higher management. The impact of the management on the selection is a more common practice - it was most frequently perceived in the selection of the lower management (39\%), followed by the middle management (34 \%), while it is least frequent in terms of the top management ( $17 \%$ ). In the selection of the middle management, there are no significant differences among the private ( $40 \%$ ) and public sectors ( $38 \%$ ); they are slightly higher in terms of the middle management - private sector $43 \%$, public sector $28 \%$, while the highest are in the selection of the top management - private sector $58 \%$ and public sector $7 \%$. The impact of politics on the selection is a less common practice than the impact of the management, but not completely absent. It is most frequent (12 \%) in terms of the top management, followed by the lower (3 \%) and middle management (2 \%). That such an influence was involved was estimated by: two organisations of the public sector in terms of the lower management and three in terms of the middle management, and 26 organisations of the public and one of the private sector in terms of the higher management. The position was given to a man, although a woman was more qualified and vice versa, the position was given to a woman, although a man was more qualified, were the last two characteristics of the last management selections available to the respondents. According to the opinion of 2 \% of the participants, the position was given to a man, although a woman was more qualified in the case of the lower and higher management; however, according to the opinion of $3 \%$ of the participants in the case of the lower and $2 \%$ in the case of the middle management, the position was given to a woman, although a man was more qualified. As expected in light of the overrepresentation of women, the latter is more frequent in the public sector, while the practice of a positon given to a man, although a woman is more qualified, was more frequently observed in the public sector.

Figure: Perceived characteristics of the last management employment


### 4.11 Diversity and obstacles to achieving balanced gender representation in decision-making positions

The last part of the questionnaire was dedicated to the measures and obstacles to achieving balanced gender representation in organisations. Firstly, we were interested in to what extent the data on gender representation in management positions are widely available. Slightly less than $8 \%$ of the participating organisations publish data on the gender representation in their management positions. The majority ( $14 \%$ ) of them are among both the joint-stock companies and state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, while the least are among the limited liability companies. In their annual report, such data is published by 28 organisations, on their websites by 16, and elsewhere by 5 organisations (e.g. in the personnel report, statistical data, etc.).

Figure: Yes, our organisation published data on the gender representation in management positions


A variety of possible measures and programmes to improve the situation in the field of the balanced representation of women and men in management positions exist. We were interested in which of the available measures were adopted and are implemented by the organisations. The programmes of training, mentoring or sponsoring aimed at the career development of all employees were adopted and are implemented in the highest share by the joint-stock companies (40 \%), were adopted and are not implemented in the highest share by the limited liability companies (8\%), and were not adopted and are not implemented in the highest share by the local communities (76 \%).

Figure: Programmes of training, mentoring or sponsoring aimed at the career development of all employees


Special programmes of training, mentoring or sponsoring aimed at the career development of women were adopted and are implemented by fewer organisations - in total, by slightly less than $4 \%$, most of them ( $6 \%$ ) are among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, while there is not a single such organisation among the joint-stock companies and limited liability companies. Among joint-stock companies, the highest share of organisations that have adopted such a programme, but are not implementing it, can be found (4\%). The highest share of those who do not have such a programme can be found among the limited liability companies (94 \%).

Figure: Programmes of training, mentoring or sponsoring aimed at the career development of women


An internal act/policy that defines measures for the balanced representation of women and men in management/executive positions was adopted by slightly less than $4 \%$ of the participating organisations in total, mostly by the joint-stock companies ( $6 \%$ ). The latter have also most frequently selected the response that they do not have any such act. And, the response that they have adopted such a measure, but they do not implement it, was most frequently selected by the local communities (2 \%).

Figure: Internal act/policy that defines measures for the balanced representation of women and men in management/executive positions


Training courses on gender equality or non-discrimination for persons involved in personnel procedures were organised in slightly less than $7 \%$ of the participating organisations. The highest share of the organisations, in which they have such training, is in the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (16 \%). Among the public institutes, there are some ( $0.7 \%$ ) that should have these training courses, but they are not implemented. The public institutes have also most frequently selected the possibility that they do not have such training courses ( $85 \%$ ) among all participants.

Figure: Training courses on gender equality or non-discrimination for persons involved in personnel procedures


An internal act that also contains provisions regarding transparency in staffing was adopted and is implemented by almost one third of the participating organisations (32 \%). Among those who have adopted the measure but do not implement it, this response was most frequently selected by the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts $(44 \%)$. In all organisational forms, there were responses present that they have adopted such a measure, but do not implement it - most frequently such a response was selected by the local communities (4 \%). They also have the highest proportion of the response that they do not have such an act (69 \%).

Figure: Internal act that also contains provisions regarding transparency in staffing


The last two questions referred to the balanced, i.e. minimum 40 percent, representation of each gender in the highest decision-making positions (company and administration directors, executive directors, etc.) and the reasons why it is not achieved by those organisations. That they have achieved the balanced representation of women and men in the highest decision-making positions was said by slightly less than $40 \%$ of the participating organisations - the highest share of those with such an estimate is among the local communities (50 \%) and the lowest among the joint-stock companies (35 \%).

Figure: Yes, we have achieved the balanced representation of women and men in the highest decision-making positions


We asked those who do not achieve the balanced representation the reasons thereof. Regardless of the organisational form, the most frequently selected response was that they are an industry in which one gender is represented in significantly larger numbers than the other - most often such a response was selected among the joint-stock companies (44 \%) and least often among the local communities (4 \%). That the top management in the organisation is represented by one person only was the second most frequently selected reason for not achieving the balanced representation of gender in the highest decision-making positions - it was most often selected among the limited liability companies (33 \%) and least often among the local communities (19 \%). The next two available responses refer to the staffing pool - there are not enough experienced and suitable candidates among women or, as the other possibility, there are not enough of them among men. It is interesting that not a single organisation among the joint-stock companies and limited liability companies believes that they do not have enough experienced and suitable male candidates, while 14 of the joint-stock companies selected the response that they do not have enough of such persons among female candidates. In the public sector, the response of the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, where slightly less than $6 \%$ selected the possibility that there are not enough experienced and suitable candidates among men, stands out the most. Despite the fact that women prevail in these sectors, slightly over one percent of the state authorities, including the courts and the offices of the prosecutor, consider that one reason for the unbalanced gender representation in the highest decision-making positions is that there are not enough experienced and suitable candidates among women. The following two possible reasons were that in the recruitment to these positions, men dominate, who mainly support the male candidates and vice versa - that women dominate, who mainly support the female candidates. None of the joint-stock and limited liability companies selected the possibility that women make decisions, whereby they support women. However, the opposite possibility that men make decisions, whereby they support men, was selected by $8 \%$ of both types of companies. In the public sector, there are fewer organisations with such responses - the most of them are among the local communities (4\%). The opposite - that women dominate who mainly support the female candidates - was most frequently estimated by the public sector among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (2 \%). That the selection criteria (written or unwritten) are typically better adjusted to men or vice versa, to women, were the next two possible responses. That they are better adjusted to women was not considered by a single joint-stock company, limited liability company or local community and by slightly over one percent of the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, and slightly under one half of a percent of the public institutes. However, that they are better adjusted to men was considered by $6 \%$ of the joint-stock companies, slightly over $3 \%$ of the limited liability companies and the
same proportion of the public sector in terms of the response that they are better adjusted to women. Those who make decisions prefer to a see man in this position was a more frequent response than preferring to see a woman in this position. That they prefer to see a woman was considered by $2 \%$ of the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, and by no other organisation. That they prefer to see a man was considered by $8 \%$ of the joint-stock companies, slightly over $6 \%$ of the limited liability companies, slightly under $4 \%$ of the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, slightly under one percent of the public institutes and by none of the local communities. Those who make decisions do not strive to find suitable men - this is believed by slightly over one percent of the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, and by no other organisation. That they do not strive to find suitable women is believed by $2 \%$ of the joint-stock companies and state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, and by slightly under one percent of the public institutes. That women less frequently decide to apply for a position is believed by $20 \%$ of the joint-stock companies, $11 \%$ of the limited liability companies, while in the public sector, the shares are significantly lower - slightly under $4 \%$ of the local communities and public institutes and slightly over $2 \%$ of the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts. Among them, there is also the highest percentage ( $5 \%$ ) of those who believe that men less frequently decide to apply for a position. This is also believed by slightly over $3 \%$ of the public institutes and slightly under $2 \%$ of the limited liability companies. Bad experience with a man or, vice versa, with a woman was also given as a possible reason for not achieving the balanced representation in the top management positions. The latter possibility was selected by slightly under $2 \%$ of the local communities and by no other organisation. The first possibility, i.e. bad experience with a man, was selected by $2 \%$ of the joint-stock companies, slightly under one percent of the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts, and by no other organisation.

Table: Perceived reasons why the organisations do not achieve balanced gender representation.

|  | Joint- <br> stock <br> company | Limited <br> authority, <br> liability <br> company <br> office <br> of the <br> prosecutor, <br> court | Local <br> community | Public |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| institute |  |  |  |  |


|  | Jointstock company | Limited liability company | State authority, office of the prosecutor, court | Local community | Public institute |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| In recruitment to these positions, men dominate, who mainly support the male candidates. | 8.0\% | 7.9\% | 2.3\% | 3.7\% | 1.1\% |
| In recruitment to these positions, women dominate, who mainly support the female candidates. | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 2.3\% | 1.9\% | 0.0\% |
| The selection criteria (written or unwritten) are typically better adjusted to men. | 6.0\% | 3.2\% | 1.2\% | 0.0\% | 0.4\% |
| The selection criteria (written or unwritten) are typically better adjusted to women. | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 1.2\% | 0.0\% | 0.4\% |
| Those who make decisions prefer to a see man in this position. | 8.0\% | 6.3\% | 3.5\% | 0.0\% | 0.7\% |
| Those who make decisions prefer to a see woman in this position. | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 2.3\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Those who make decisions do not strive to find suitable women. | 2.0\% | 0.0\% | 2.3\% | 0.0\% | 0.7\% |
| Those who make decisions do not strive to find suitable men. | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 1.2\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| Women do not decide to apply for a position. | 20.0\% | 11.1\% | 2.3\% | 3.7\% | 3.7\% |
| Men do not decide to apply for a position. | 0.0\% | 1.6\% | 4.7\% | 0.0\% | 3.3\% |
| We had a bad experience with a man. | 2.0\% | 0.0\% | 1.2\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% |
| We had a bad experience with a woman. | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 1.9\% | 0.0\% |



## 5. Discussion and recommendations for action


#### Abstract

One of the methods to improve the situation in the field of the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions is the introduction of special measures, in particular setting the minimum share of each gender (so called quotas). The experiences of the countries that have already introduced such measures show that such action is efficient. However, its efficiency is limited only to those management positions or companies to which it explicitly refers. The level of efficiency is also improved by sanctions - where there are no sanctions, the efficiency of the measure is smaller. The experiences of other countries have also showed that parallel to such measures being introduced, obstacles for the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions have to be eliminated. The main reason for these obstacles at the personal, organisational and social levels are stereotypes. From them derives the traditional division of care work - women, on average, spend more time taking care of children and ill/elderly family members; the belief of what suitable posts for a certain gender are also derives from them; moreover, the social attitude towards women and men who step outside their expected social roles derives from them. An important role in changing the stereotype practices is played by the employers - they can, by means of a variety of measures (from measures for easier reconciliation of private and professional life for all groups of employees, also those with positional power, and measures to help the career development of the underrepresented gender to measures for more transparent staffing methods), significantly contribute to a larger share of the underrepresented gender in management positions. This research contributes to the understanding of the impact of (non) transparent staffing practices on the (non)balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions in the Slovenian private and public sectors, and provides an insight in the staffing procedures for the selection/appointment of different levels of management, whereby it examines certain other factors which may influence the overrepresentation of men in decision-making positions in the economy.


### 5.1 Discussion and summary of the research report

The research performed on the sample of 543 organisations of the Slovenian private and public sectors showed a non-balanced representation of women and men among all employees in the majority of the participating organisations, which was expected considering that the majority of the participating organisations are from the public sector, where women prevail. Slightly over one tenth ( $12 \%$ ) of the organisations has a gender balanced composition, the most of them among the local communities ( $32 \%$ ) and joint-stock companies ( $28 \%$ ), while the least among the state authorities, including the offices of the prosecutor and courts (4 \%).

In the majority (71 \%) of the participating organisations, they already had a woman in the highest decision-making position (e.g. chairperson of the board, head, etc.) - however, the difference between the private and public sectors is big - while in the private sector, more than half of the organisations had never had a woman in the highest decision-making position,
there are significantly fewer of such organisations in the private sector. The situation in the private sector has not changed since 2011, when we performed a similar analysis (Government Office for Equal Opportunities, 2012) - at that time, our sample also contained slightly under a quarter ( $23 \%$ ) of the organisations with a balanced share of women and men among all employees (currently $20 \%$ ) and $67 \%$ of the organisations in which a woman had never been in the highest decision-making position (currently also $67 \%$ ).

In literature, the expectation that a person in a management position shall stay at work beyond full-time working hours is given as a possible obstacle for the underrepresentation of women in decision-making positions. Because women, on average, still take on the larger share of care work, such an expectation - although established as an unwritten rule - may be one of the factors as to why women do not apply for such positions at all. Namely, the research has shown two things: first, the estimate that such expectations towards employees and leaders exists is more frequent in the private sector; and second, the existence of such expectations was more frequently observed towards leaders than employees in general.

A sexist working environment, in which the unwritten rules that men are more suitable for the top positions and closed male networks exist, and which, is in general, more unkind to women, may be an important obstacle for the full realisation of women's potential and their career rise to management positions. In the case of all participating organisations, the respondents expressed agreement that such characteristics exist in their organisation. Again, a difference between the private and public sectors was shown - there is more of such sexism perceived in the private sector. In the public sector, the local communities with the perceptions close to those of the private sector stand out - this is not unexpected, since the local communities constitute a part of the public sector, in which the share of the top management (female mayors) has never exceeded $8 \%$.

Transparency and ethics of personnel selections and the estimate of the attitude of organisations towards such issues are the next possible reasons for the overrepresentation of the male gender in decision-making positions. Recruitment to different levels of management through family, collegial or friendly networks, the impact of politics on the selection of the management of organisations and non-transparency of the personnel procedures were observed by the respondents in all the participating organisations. Contrary to the preceding two sets of obstacles (sexist working environment and expectation of extra presence in workplace), in this case there are no significant differences between the private and public sectors - the biggest differences are in terms of the impact of politics that is more frequently observed in the public sector. There are also smaller differences in agreement with the statement that the staffing procedures are transparent in their organisation - the public sector expressed a higher level of agreement and simultaneously, also a higher level of disagreement. Considering that the organisations of the public sector are subject to greater supervision and that the procedures are more arranged there, such a response was expected.

High ethical commitments and placement of the issues of integrity/ethics/corruption prevention high on the scale of organisational values may have an indirect impact on the share of women in decision-making positions, since the staffing of those organisations with such organisational practices is more transparent, i.e. by means of notices, criteria and measures and not though informal networks, in which men are better integrated than women. Compared to the estimate that the personnel procedures are transparent, the devotion of their organisation to ethical commitments was estimated worse by the participants- although it was so estimated for all organisational forms in more than half of the cases, differences between the public and private sectors exist. The public sector expressed higher levels of
agreement, which was expected considering that the organisations of the public sector are required to prepare integrity plans and define the risks of corruption, consequently making these topics more prominent in the public sector.

We were somewhat surprised that there is a high share of those who defined the personnel procedures in their organisations, in general, as transparent (93 \% in total) - such a high share can probably be in part attributed to the social desirability of the organisational practices to be transparent and in part to the genuine belief that this is true, although a more detailed insight into the staffing practices for management positions shows a slightly different picture which is addressed in continuation. Given the grounds for transparent personnel procedures, the participants could express their agreement with five available possibilities: awareness of persons who decide on staffing that it is hard to expect high ethical standards from disputably recruited persons; that, by means of nepotistic or clientelistic employment, the possibility of selecting the best personnel available is limited; that a transparent procedure means the selection of the best personnel available; respect for legislation and high ethical standards in the field of staffing. As expected, the highest level of agreement can be found in the case of the statement that this is respect for legislation (92 \%) and the lowest in the case of the statement that persons who decide on staffing are aware that it is hard to expect high ethical standards from disputably recruited persons ( $83 \%$ ). There are differences between the responses of the private and public sectors - the highest (13 percentage points) in the case of the aforementioned statement and the lowest (2 percentage points) in case of the statement that persons who decide on staffing are aware that by employment though the family, collegial or friendly networks they would have limited the possibility of selecting the best personnel available in a certain moment on the labour market.

More than half of the participating organisations do not have a control system to examine the staffing procedures from the transparency perspective introduced ( $57 \%$ of organisations in total); the highest shares of such organisations are in the private sector. Among those who have a certain level (for all cases, appeal cases, random cases) of such a control system, there are significantly higher shares of organisations that are familiar with such a system for all cases in the public sector (slightly over a quarter of the public sector and approximately one sixth of the private sector). Such a result was also expected, since the organisations of the public sector are typically concerned with this area also in their integrity plans and are aware that they are under greater public scrutiny. It is interesting that most frequently such control is carried out by the actual notice committee - which might be a contentious issue, since it implies that the committee is controlling its own work. It is also interesting that almost half ( $42 \%$ ) of the participants believe that such control is not necessary - it is least favoured in the joint stock companies (57 \%), while the highest share of those who believe that it is always or occasionally needed is in the state authorities, including the courts and offices of the prosecutor (78 \%). Such a response is not surprising - this topic is more frequently on the agenda in the public sector than in the private sector, whereby it can be expected that on one hand, the level of awareness is higher, and on the other, that such responses are more socially desirable in the public sector than in the private one. It was stated by $8 \%$ of the organisations ( $6 \%$ informally and 2 \% formally) that somebody has, in the last five years, pointed out non-transparent recruitment to the management positions in their organisation in cases where a woman was a more suitable candidate, but the man was appointed to the position - it is not surprising that such a percentage is higher in the private sector ( $10 \%$ informally and $4 \%$ formally in the joint-stock companies), since the share of women in management positions is smaller there.

Gender discriminatory practices of promotion are one of the most important obstacles denying women access to management posts. We examined how the respondents estimate
general acceptability of the example of promotion involving direct gender discrimination to the detriment of a female candidate. As an example, the promotion on which the directly superior head decides, was given - he can choose between a female candidate who is ambitious, better educated, has performed better in tests, has bigger support of the collective and plans to have more children, and a male candidate whose performance on the tests was above average, but not as good as that of the female candidate, and has adult children. The head selected the male candidate on the grounds that the female candidate would not have been as dedicated to the work as the male candidate, since she would go on maternity leave. Approximately two thirds ( $65 \%$ ) of the participants estimated that such a method of staffing would be perceived as (very) unacceptable in their organisation - whereby the differences between the private and public sectors are significant: in the private sector, it is perceived as (very) unacceptable by 48 \% of all participants and in the public sector by 68 . Consequently, higher shares of those who believe that it would have been perceived as (very) acceptable are seen in the private sector.

In the example of non-transparent staffing, the two possibilities that it would have been perceived as (very) unacceptable were selected less often than in the example of gender discriminatory promotion - $41 \%$ in total. The hypothetical example, for which the respondents had to estimate the general level of acceptability in their organisation, showed a procedure of multiphase selection, in which the female candidate performed better in all phases than the male candidate who always came second. During the procedure, the female candidate informs the committee of her pregnancy; the committee selected her and suggested that the management conclude the contract with her. The final decision is not known, but the management invited both the female and male candidates to be interviewed, although it respected the committee's decision in a recent procedure and concluded the contract with the proposed person. This time, officially, the management wishes to have the possibility of selection among more persons, but unofficially, does wish to employ a person leaving for parental leave. The procedure is disputable because due to the pregnancy of the female candidate, the selection procedure was different than in the previous case of staffing in this company, when gender did not played any role in the selection of the personnel. In terms of this question, the differences between the private and public sectors are also significant more than one third of the private sector estimated that such a procedure would have been perceived as (very) acceptable, while the share in the public sector was significantly lower (approximately one sixth).

Estimate of acceptability of discriminatory and non-transparent staffing is an important indicator of normalisation of such practices. Although on the grounds of these estimates (that are also based on the personal beliefs of the respondents about the (non)disputability of such practices), it cannot be concluded how much of such staffing actually takes place in practice, we can assume that it does exist and that it is not self-evidently perceived as disputable or even illegal. One of the reasons that such staffing practices are perceived as acceptable is also the stereotype assumption that a woman is the one that shall take the entire one-year parental leave and later be absent in order to care of a sick child. A possible reason that such practices are estimated as more acceptable in the private sector than in the public one also lies in the belief that the private sector cannot afford to have people absent due to parental obligations. Research on Gender equality in family life and relationships (MLFSA, 2012) showed that there are important differences between female and male managers about how important an aspect of work for them is the reconciliation of private and professional life and the possibility of organisation of working time (both were much more important to women than men) and in terms of the family obligations that have already presented an obstacle
resulting in persons giving up their promotion, which applied for three times more women than men; moreover, women have one time more frequently already changed their jobs when compared to men so as to reconcile their family and professional obligations more easily, while family obligations also presented an obstacle for not changing jobs one time more frequently for women, although they wanted to. It can therefore be concluded that the organisations are not doing enough to enable their employees to more easily reconcile their private and professional lives regardless of their position level, which in practice presents a bigger obstacle for women than for men, whereby the organisations are not using the potential, knowledge and experience of both.

The middle management posts are those that present a springboard for higher (the highest) organisational positions, thus additional attention was given to the staffing methods for this level of management. The publication of internal or public notices for filling these vacancies proved not be a standard practice either in the public or the private sector - in four out of five cases, they are published in the public sector and in three out of five in the private sector. In total, internal notices were published in almost a third of cases, whereby it occurred slightly more frequently in the private sector. It is not rare for the selection procedure to be a mere formality, because the person is selected in advance (in approximately $14 \%$ of cases), often this means personal selection of the superior (every fifth case in the private sector and every eight in the public sector). Other disputable practices were also observed, e.g. nepotism (one time more frequently in the private sector than in the public one), adjustment of the requirements for filling a vacancy to a pre-chosen person (slightly more frequently in the public sector than in the private one) and different forms of discriminatory practices - when the (in)formal criteria are more adjusted to persons without family obligations (approximately $5 \%$ ), men (almost three times more frequently in the private sector than in the public one) or women (slightly more frequently in the private sector than in the public one). That these requirements are better adjusted to men than to women was a practice which was more than three times more frequently detected in the private sector and two times more in the public sector. In summary, this is why many good personnel do not even get a chance regardless of their gender. If such practices are considered as an organisational "public secret", many good personnel might not even decide to apply, since they estimate that the positions are awarded in advance, although this might not be the case. In general, it was estimated that the middle management selection procedures in the private sector are more often disputable that in the public sector, which could present a serious obstacle for the less represented gender (more frequent adjustment of the selection criteria to men and persons without family obligations, staffing based on the personal selection of the superior, etc.).

The transparency of a certain personnel procedure starts before the publication of the vacancy notice and is in any case evident in the actual notice. The notices for management posts, when published by the organisations, most often contain a description of the primary tasks and responsibilities related to the post (in four out of five cases), a description of the key competences that are necessary to perform certain work (which occurs more frequently in the private sector than in the public sector), the reasons for a new vacancy (in two out of five cases), a description of the selection procedure implementation method (more frequently in the public sector than in the private sector), a description of the expected results (more frequently in the private sector than in the public sector) and - although rarely, might also contain the discriminatory requirements in the form of an expected status (e.g. without obligations, young, energetic, fresh graduate, etc.) (more frequently in the private sector than in the public sector). From the transparency perspective, it would reasonably be expected that all notices contain at least a description of the selection procedure implementation method (e.g. test, two-stage interview, etc.) for the candidates to know in advance and for each stage
where they stand and what awaits them. From the perspective of selection transparency, a description of the key competences that are necessary to perform certain work is also necessary - namely, the selection criteria and appeal arguments of a non-selected person arise from such competences.

Transparent management personnel selection procedure (regardless of the position level) means that the selection criteria are formed before a notice is published, are made public or are publicly available, that the evaluation procedure of the candidates is fair and objective - for example, that it includes written tests which measure required capabilities to fill a certain vacancy, that they all get the same, pre-determined questions, that the responses are recorded, that they all have the same amount of time available to respond to those questions, that the selection procedure is recorded and the (non)selection of a person justified in writing, that transparent appeal procedures exist and that the composition of committees and other organisational factors provide for their professional and non-biased work. Within this set, it was demonstrated that the staffing practices for management personnel (lower, middle or higher) are often non-transparent - not even the selection criteria which, in $15 \%$ of the participating organisations, are (almost) never formed before a notice is published, and in every tenth organisation are not even published. It is not rare that the requirements are adjusted to a pre-chosen candidate (7 \%) or that notices are not published but invitations to specific candidates are sent instead (7\%). The vast majority of the participants estimate that the evaluation procedures of the candidates for management positions in their organisations are (almost) always fair and objective (86 \%), although a closer look shows that in half of the cases, they (almost) never use written tests that measure capabilities for filling a certain vacancy and in slightly over one tenth the candidates do not get the same, predetermined questions and, in $6 \%$ of cases, they (almost) never have the same amount of time available to respond to them, while in only slightly over one third of cases each response is written down by all members of the committee or, in slightly under half of cases, the responses are recorded in a joint document, and in three out of five cases, the potential internal candidates do not have access to more information than persons from the outside, and also, in $17 \%$ of cases, not only the person involved in the selection procedure is familiar with the questions for the written test and interview. Committees for management personnel selection can be a big factor in increasing the objectivity of selection, if they are properly composed and are able to operate independently. The practice shows that in one tenth of cases, committees are not selected subject to the understanding of the field of work in which the person shall be employed, in two out of five cases, they lack a person that would present an "outside view", in one quarter of cases, the same members of the committee are not present at individual interviews for the same post, in one quarter of cases, a member who establishes an actual or possible conflict of interests (almost) never eliminates her/ himself from the procedure, while in one tenth of cases, the members are (almost) always exposed to pressures, suggestions or other influences of the management pertaining to the course of the selection and/or procedure. In the actions of actual selection, attention was paid to the questions of the (non)selection justification, possibility of appeal, verification of references, observation of gender discriminatory practices and role of the personnel service in the promotion of the employees. In slightly under one third of cases, there (almost) never exists a written document with an explanation as to why somebody was (not)selected and who was responsible such a decision, educational and professional references are (almost) never verified in slightly over one tenth of organisations, while in $6 \%$ of the organisations, the appeal procedure is (almost) never available. In four out of five organisations, the notice is not published when a pre-selected candidate for a management position has outstandingly good competences, while in one tenth of the organisations it is believed that in their organisation,
the management personnel selection procedures are (almost) never such that they would not include any gender discrimination. In just two out of five cases, the role of the personnel service is (almost) always also involved in the decision-making process (not just drawing-up the decision) on the promotion of employees.

In summary: disputable practices are, on average, more frequently observed in the private sector than in the public sector, whereby we have to take into account that the public sector is subject to greater supervision (integrity plans, public information, etc.) and that the topics of transparency are, consequently, more prominent and - consequently - awareness is probably higher. Such non-transparent methods of management staffing strongly narrow the possibility of equal access to apply for positions and to be selected for said positions and increase the possibility of selection according to the principle "more of the same" when diversity is not promoted (not by gender and neither by any other personal circumstances). We have discussed the reasons which speak in support of diversity in Chapter III.

In making the final decision on the selection of an individual to a management position level, some differences between the private and public sectors can be observed, that are the result of the characteristics of the organisational forms. Thus, the supervisory authorities are those that most frequently decide on the selection of the top management of the joint-stock companies, while most frequently a direct superior has the last word in terms of the middle and lower management; owners most frequently make decisions on the selection of the middle and higher management of the limited liability companies, while the lowest management is most frequently selected by a direct superior; in the state authorities, including the courts and the offices of the prosecutor, most frequently a direct superior has the last word in terms of the lower and middle management and politics in terms of the higher management; in the local communities, special committees most frequently decide on the selection of the lower and middle management and an electorate on the selection of the higher management; in public institutes, most frequently a direct superior has the final say in the selection of the lower and middle management and a supervisory authority in the selection of the higher management.

From the aspect of organisational obstacles which hinder access to management positions, the committees' awareness of gender equality (gender stereotypes, arguments for balanced representation, organisational and social obstacles for balanced representation in decisionmaking positions, etc.) is an important factor in overcoming bad practices. Thus, we took a closer look at the committees that conduct selection procedures also from the perspective of their gender composition and awareness of gender equality and impartiality. In as little as slightly under one tenth of the organisations, they are concerned that the composition of the committees that conduct interviews with candidates for management is gender diversified. That all members of the committees are aware of gender equality was estimated by slightly over half of a percent of organisations that have such committees; measures to minimise the risk of bias of the members are only applied by $7 \%$ of the organisations. In this area, there are still a lot of opportunities for improvement of the situations indicated, which shall be discussed in the last part of the chapter.

We were interested in more detail about the last employment of the management in the studied organisations (regardless of the position level and when it took place). The responses confirmed what we already knew: the criteria for filling a vacancy are not always made public in advance; in only one fifth of cases, the candidates were estimated in writing pursuant to the criteria; in less than half of cases, the procedure was conducted by a committee; in less than one third of cases, the gender diversified committee was provided; in less than half of cases, the selection procedure was documented; in one third of cases, management had an impact on
the selection, and in smaller shares, politics had an impact on the selection, the requirements were adjusted to a pre-chosen candidate or a person of a certain gender was appointed to the position, although the person of the opposite gender was much better qualified.

Organisations can adopt numerous measures in the area of gender equality or to eliminate obstacles to balanced representation in decision-making positions. The first thing the organisations can do is to make the data more widely available - less than a tenth of the participants publish data on the gender representation in their management positions. Programmes of training, mentoring or sponsoring aimed at the career development of all employees were adopted and are implemented by slightly over one quarter of the organisations (more in the private sector than in the public sector) - while such programmes intended for women by less than $4 \%$ of the participants (more in the public sector than in the private sector). An internal act/policy that defines measures for the balanced representation of women and men in the management/executive positions was adopted and is implemented by $4 \%$ of organisations (more in the private sector than in the public sector), training courses on gender equality or non-discrimination for persons involved in personnel procedures are organised in $7 \%$ of the organisations (more in the public sector), and an internal act that also contains provisions regarding transparency in staffing was adopted and is implemented by 32 \% of organisations.

The situation in the area of gender diversity of the management and the estimated reasons for the non-balanced representation of women and men in decision-making
positions are similar to those detected in the analysis performed in 2012 in the private sector (Robnik 2012). Two out of five participating organisations state that they have achieved the balanced representation of women and men in the highest decision-making positions, whereby more frequently in the private than public sector. Those who have not achieved the balanced representation most frequently give the reasons that this is an industry in which the male gender is represented in a significantly larger number and that the top management in their organisation is represented by one person only. Significant differences between the public and private sectors appear in responses that pertain to gender - the existence of such factors that constitute an obstacle for women is more frequently detected in the private sector: that there are not suitable and experienced candidates among women; that men dominate in staffing who mainly support the male candidates; that un(written) selection criteria are typically better adjusted to men; those who make decisions prefer to see a man in these positions; those who make decisions do not strive to find suitable female candidates; and that women do not decide to apply for positions. In the public sector, the factors that constitute an obstacle for men are more frequently detected, although it has to be emphasised that the shares of these factors are significantly lower than of those that constitute an obstacle for women. It is also interesting that in the private sector, not a single organisation stated that they do not have suitable and experienced male candidates and that those who make decisions prefer to see a woman in this position or they do not strive to find suitable men. Such a structure of responses shows that an important task lies ahead in both the private and public sectors, as follows: to eliminate all obstacles that hinder equal access to management or executive positions to one or the other gender. Some recommendations are given in the final part of this chapter.

### 5.2 Recommendations for action

The research showed that both in the private and public sectors, non-transparent practices of selecting management personnel are present and also that in both sectors, elements of sexist working environments and the absence of efficient measures for the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions were detected. The measures for the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions are described in more detail in two guidelines of the Managers' Association of Slovenia (Include.All - Guidelines for Equality Promotion from 2012 and in the guidelines that were created within the framework of the same project as this research). The elimination of elements of sexist working environments (e.g. the existence of closed male networks, an environment that is, in general, unkind to women, unwritten rules that men are more suitable for the top management positions) requires a change of organisational culture, awareness raising of the existence of gender stereotypes and action for their elimination, and also a lot of attention to be paid to all other aspects of gender equality. Since this is not the primary research topic of this research, we hereby focus only on the more transparent management personnel selection procedures.

Let us take a look at some possible measures for more transparent staffing that shall contribute to the selection of the best available personnel on the grounds of their actual merits and not on the grounds of gender. The measures are divided into different phases of the selection procedure, whereby also the organisational characteristics and special characteristics of a post undoubtedly have to be observed.

## Selection criteria

- Selection criteria are prepared before a notice is published.
- Selection criteria are made public.
- Selection criteria are explained to the interested applicants.
- Special attention is paid to the selection criteria being objective and measurable and not (gender) discriminatory.


## Vacancy notice

- Description of the primary tasks and responsibilities related to the post.
- Description of the key competences which are necessary to perform the work.
- Description of the expected results.
- Description of the selection criteria.
- Description of the selection procedure implementation method.


## Selection committee

- Composed of both female and male members; when possible, other types of diversity are observed.
- Members know the field in which the person shall work.
- At least one member should provide an "outside view".
- The same members are present at each individual interview for the same post.
- (Self)elimination in case of an actual or possible conflict of interests.
- Members have knowledge from the area of gender equality or non-discrimination.


## Procedures of evaluation of the candidates

- Only on the basis of predetermined criteria.
- Written tests that measure the capabilities for filling a certain vacancy (e.g. written communication, critical thinking, reasoning capabilities, etc.)
- Potential internal candidates do not have access to more information than those coming from the outside.
- Only the person involved in the selection procedure (committee, personnel service, etc.) are familiar with the questions (for test and interview).
- Each candidate is given the same, pre-determined questions (in the written and oral parts).
- Each candidate has the same amount of time available to respond to the questions.
- The answers are recorded (by all members of the committee or in the joint document of the committee).
- The committee prepares a written justification for each candidate on reasons for their (non)selection.
- The entire procedure is documented, whereby it is indicated who was responsible for the final decision.


## Control and appeal procedure

- Introduced control system that examines the staffing procedures from the perspective of transparency.
- Introduced control system that examines the staffing procedures from the perspective of non-discrimination.
- Ifthe candidate is not satisfied with the selection, there is a transparent appeals procedure available.

The current situation in the field of the balanced representation of women and men in decisionmaking positions in the Slovenian private and public sectors is not exemplary. Based on the results of this research and the findings of foreign research, it can be concluded that - in addition to all other measures (e.g. legislation, awareness-raising, elimination of stereotypes, measures for the career development of women, etc.) - also more transparent and formalised procedures of staffing could contribute to its improvement. The improvement of the situation in any area of gender equality is usually a long-distance race, since - inter alia - it requires the stereotype, through generations-rooted notions of what is appropriate for one or the other gender, to be changed. The measures of countries are often ahead of the willingness of society to adopt them in practice, although nobody opposes them in principle. However, the inconvenience of a measure should not be an obstacle to increasing equal opportunities - gender equality is a principle adopted by all democratic societies and applies to all areas of life, as well as to the functioning and organisation of societies.


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[^0]:    1 The questionnaire was prepared by the Equal Opportunities Department of the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, while a few questions were contributed by the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption.

[^1]:    2 Article 7 of the Equal Opportunities for Women and Men Act defines the representation of gender as non-balanced when the representation of one gender in a specific field of social life or in a part of such a field is lower than $40 \%$.

[^2]:    Source: International Labour Organisation (2015): Women in Business and Management. Gaining Momentum. Abridget Version of the Global report.

[^3]:    4 Female mayor or director of municipal administration

[^4]:    Persons who decide on staffing are aware that it is hard to expect high ethical standards from disputably recruited persons (e.g. backdoor staffing, recruitment of relatives, etc.).

[^5]:    5 In total, 422 of the participants (78 \%) responded to the question - namely, when combining the organisational form and types of management employment, the absolute numbers are mostly too small to perform a more detailed analysis by individual organisational forms; therefore, the shares are pointed out only when this makes sense, while all other data are presented collectively, i.e. jointly for all organisational forms. This does not enable us to establish possible differences among individual organisational forms, i.e. among the public and private sectors, but it does provide us with a general insight into the staffing practices.

